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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigated the fiscal behavior of local public school districts under 
the segregated schools system in Maryland with the emphasis on the relative response of 
school expenditure to intergovernmental grants-in-aid between black and white schools. The 
median voter model was employed to derive theoretical demand specifications for both no-
nonresidential-property-tax-shifting and partial-shifting assumptions. The theoretical model 
derived here is unique in the sense that inter-racial factors are included to determine the 
demand for education in black and white schools, since the provision of public education 
services was decided simultaneously by the median voter who was presumed to be white. 
A pooled cross-section and time series data set from 1929 through 1955 was utilized 
for empirical estimates of both theoretical models and ad hoc adjusted models. The methods 
of ordinary least squares and nonlinear least squares were used to obtain unbiased estimates 
for both no tax shifting and partial tax shifting models, respectively. The simulation of the 
effect of nonexistence of government policy (grants) was also performed. 
The results showed that the expenditure or demand for education in black school 
districts was much more responsive to intergovernmental grants than in white school districts. 
Also, the ratio of per pupil expenditure between black and white was one-half in 1929, but 
almost one in 1955. In addition, simulation results showed that grants had a greater effect on 
spending for black schools than for white schools. Hence, the equalization of expenditure 
levels or the reduction of the gap in economic and social well-being between blacks and 
whites could have been achieved much faster had there been a way to allocate more of 
viii 
available state and federal grants-in-aid to black schools so as to stimulate the voter's 
spending on black schools. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists in the economics of education have identified at least three ways in which 
education generates a public good. First, the general level of public education benefits each 
individual in society. Second, education is one mechanism through which the shared norms 
and common experiences that contribute to social cohesion and stability are inculcated. Thus, 
education may be said to generate the public good of social cohesion and stability. Third, 
education may help to redistribute economic outcomes - income and well-being. One way to 
reduce income inequality is to give some people more education than they would choose or 
purchase in a perfectly fi-ee market. By improving the individual's work skills, education 
enables one to earn a better living and thus also may improve the quality of one's life. 
Furthermore, the benefit that one individual derives from the general level of education does 
not diminish the benefit that anyone else derives from generalized literacy, factual knowledge, 
political insight, social stability, or equality of economic outcomes. Therefore, the general 
level of educational attainment in society is a public good, and it is hard to believe that it 
would be provided in the right amount by an entirely fi-ee market economy. 
Many researches utilizing the human capital approach have been directed to resolve 
the relationship between schooling or school quality and subsequent performance - test scores, 
wage or income. It has been asserted that the difference in schooling or school quality causes 
the disparity in black-white wages and in well-being in future years (Welch 1973, Orazem 
1987). This would be the case if years of schooling completed or school quality were not 
comparable for blacks and whites simply because of the lower level of per capita schooling 
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inputs allocated to black schools. Thus, it should be useful to examine the trend of the relative 
expenditure between black and white school districts in terms of governmental discriminatory 
policy against black pupils in the provision of public education in the segregated era. 
This study investigates the fiscal behavior of local public school districts under the 
segregated school system in Maryland during the years 1929 through 1955, with emphasis on 
the relative response of school expenditure to intergovernmental grants-in-aid between black 
and white schools. The state of Maryland had a unique setting among school systems during 
this time period. Schools were segregated by race, and school districts and county boundaries 
were coterminous. The ratio of per pupil expenditure between black and white was almost 
one-half in 1929 but approached unity in 1955, which was the last year of the segregated 
school system. 
The study may be viewed fi-om a disciplinary perspective and as a policy-oriented 
empirical investigation. From a disciplinary perspective, its objective is to derive an 
appropriate theoretical model of local public school expenditure determination under a 
segregated school system. The emphasis is on the impact of intergovernmental aid on public 
school expenditure. The policy-oriented objective is to apply the model statistically to 
investigate the impact of changes in the amount of intergovernmental aid on expenditure levels 
of school districts. Especially, it concentrates on the relative expenditure between black and 
white in terms of changes in governmental policy in the provision of public education services. 
There has been a refinement of the theory of intergovernmental grants-in-aid in 
theoreticai and empirical studies since the late 1960s. Some predictions of the theory are 
supported by empirical studies while others are not. There still remains much to be learned 
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about the response of grant recipients, as every state or locality represents a different 
institutional setting. To make the logical connection between the theoretical model and the 
empirical analysis, this study follows the approaches of Barr and Davis (1966), Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973), Perkins (1977, 1984) and Tumbull (1987), but mainly Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972). This approach permits the use of the pooled cross-section and time series data 
of the segregated school districts in the estimation. 
This study extends the public choice approach to the area of public school finance. It 
derives theoretical models which include the inter-racial factors to determine the separate 
demands for education of black and white students. There are only a few studies that deal with 
racially segregated school systems. Margo (1982), Pritchett (1985), Fishback (1989) and 
Gerber (1991) investigated the trend of demand for education and changes in relative 
educational expenditures. However, they dealt with the southern states at the turn of the 
century, fi-om the late 1800s to early 1900s, which is quite different from this study 
geographically and in the period of time covered. Thus, their results cannot be compared 
directly to the results of this study. 
This study utilizes a comprehensive data set of pooled cross-section and time series for 
a 27-year time period, 1929 through 1955, to test the theoretical predictions of the models. 
Whether or not the results are consistent with the theory and those of other studies will be of 
interest. Although the resuhs of the models employed in other studies may be valid, they may 
not be relevant to Maryland's segregated school system of this time period. 
In Chapter II, an overview of intergovernmental grants-in-aid will be presented. The 
role of government and types of grants in public school finance are discussed. Discussion of 
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the policy relevance of the impact of grants is followed by review of the empirical literature on 
the subject, with special attention on the impacts of different grants on education expenditure. 
The median voter hypothesis and criticism of it are presented in Chapter III. The empirical 
specification problems involved with education are also discussed. A theoretical model of 
local education expenditure and the actual specification of the expenditure equation to be 
estimated are derived in Chapter IV. The data, sample statistics, and econometric results are 
discussed in Chapter V, and the summary and conclusion are discussed in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER n. INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS-IN-AID: THEORY AND REVIEW 
A. The Role of Governments in Public School Finance 
The general economic view of local government finance is that decentralization allows the 
provision of public services to reflect the variety of individual preferences, since local governments 
can select different levels of services and individuals can choose their own area of residence. 
Although the level of local spending may not be eflRcient, given fixed jurisdictional boundaries, 
inteijurisdictional externalities, and means of local budget determination, fiscal decentralization 
remains the only alternative to the insuperable problem of determining the optimal level of 
expenditure on public services provided by a central government. 
The financing of public education in the United States involves federal, state, and local 
government fimds. Public elementary and secondary education is provided by more than 16,000 
local school districts. Most of these are independent special-purpose units of local government with 
authority to levy taxes and set their own budgets. The remaining districts, although subordinate to 
municipal or county governments, are generally controlled by separate local governing boards and 
also have considerable financial autonomy. While public schools are a state responsibility in 
general, the school financing system is a decentralized one in which state authority is exercised 
indirectly. The states take constitutional responsibility for education by charging state legislatures 
with maintaining uniform systems of common schools. Typically, the states make elementary and 
secondary schooling compulsory, and develop a set of laws regarding curriculum, personnel, and 
other facets of their operation. Those are the rules according to which local school districts or 
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educational agencies may determine budgets and set taxes. The states share the burden of financing 
by providing grants-in-aid to the districts and impose restrictions of varying severity on how state 
and local flmds can be used. But most states leave their districts wide latitude to determine the 
levels at which they will fiond public schools and the tax rates they will impose. 
The federal government's role in the school finance system is minor compared to the roles 
of states and localities. It consists mainly of providing an assortment of special-purpose categorical 
grants, most of which are channeled to the local districts via state agents. The rationale for federal 
grants to education is based on the fact that the nation may place relatively different priorities on 
some educational issues than the state and local educational agencies. Grants represent one method 
of getting state and local educational agencies to address federal concerns through the tailoring of 
specific grants to those governments to provide subsidies for services that fulfill the national 
priorities. Other rationales are discussed in the following section. However, there has been an 
argument that increased federal funds - especially during the decade 1965-75, called the period of 
"CTeative federalism," and after that period - would necessarily lead to lessened local control of 
schools and to making decisions with poorer information about demands and educational needs in 
each local area. 
B. Theory of Intergovernmental Grants-in-Aid 
1. Types and effects 
In general, there are two rationales for intergovernmental grants (Gramlich 1977). 
First are economic justifications, where higher-level government could have efficiency, equity, 
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or stabilization objectives that impinge on lower governments in various ways. The (open-end) 
matching grants, and unconditional (general) grants or closed-end lump-sum transfers are in 
this category. Second are political or institutional justifications, where lower-level 
governments are viewed as agents of higher-level government policy. The closed-end 
categorical grants are of this kind. Standard indifference curve theory, which reflects the 
preferences of the decisive voter and is assumed to be a Sanction of the preferences of others 
in the community, can be used to indicate the effect of these different type of grants on the 
budgets of lower levels of government. 
a. (Open-end) matching grants 
Matching grants refer to a mechanism whereby a higher-level government would 
provide a specified proportion of the expenditure of a lower-level government in an area of 
concern. Matching grants denote the proportion of local expenditure that a higher-level 
government will pay (match) for each category of services. Definitions of which services are 
eligible, the matching rates, and the appropriate accounting system for reporting expenditures 
are all that is required fi^om a regulatory standpoint. The justification for the matching grants 
is benefit spillovers. The general idea is that not all of the benefits of a local expenditure are 
captured within the community. Therefore, other community or higher-level governments 
should subsidize this good or service. 
These grants alter the relative prices facing lower levels of government. If there is a 
reduction in ihe relative price of the grant-aided good, expenditures will increase by an 
amount depending on the price elasticity of demand. If expenditure demand is price elastic, 
8 
total (all of lower and higher levels of government) expenditures on grant-aided goods will 
increase by more than the grant, and expenditures on all other goods will decline; vice versa if 
expenditure demand is price inelastic. 
Examples at the federal level include public assistance and medicaid. Some state 
governments have these kinds of grants in the area of education and other social services. 
Since most of these grants are open-end, the level of grants is determined simultaneously with 
the level of expenditures. 
b. General (unconditional) grants, or closed-end lump sum transfer 
The second economic justification regards the distribution of income to either all 
income groups more or less proportionately, or to any specific income groups, especially to 
low-income groups somewhat disproportionately. If the public services (health, education, 
public safety, or others) should be provided at equal cost in the two communities, or more 
cheaply in low-income communities from the social point of view, the higher level government 
will have a reason to redistribute income among communities - giving to low-income 
communities, and taking away from or not giving to the high-income communities. 
A revenue sharing program more focused on poor jurisdictions could be justified by an 
extension of this argument. Revenue sharing refers to the federal government returning a 
portion of federal revenues to state and local governments to use as they see fit. The notion 
behind it is less a national concern with regard to the state-local provision of particular goods 
or services than it is a sharing of national tax sources Avith other governmental units. 
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Accordingly, revenue sharing is not a system of grants to support particular public 
goods as much as it is an approach to augmenting state and local government revenues. In 
that sense, it can be used to increase any or all public goods, as well as to reduce local tax 
effort through financing of expenditures that would have been funded fi"om state-local 
revenues. The effects of revenue sharing on any specific expenditures will depend on the 
relative preferences of state-local governmental units for various public goods or services. 
Economists generally view the effects of revenue sharing on public expenditures as similar to 
that of any increase in community income. 
Since these grants change the income of the community and not relative prices, the 
change in expenditures will usually be less than the grants if both public and private goods 
have positive income elasticities. Even though the response of expenditures is smaller than 
with the same-sized grants of the open-end matching type, such a grant is used to redistribute 
income among jurisdictions, since the lack of restriction on spending allows each community 
to maximize its own welfare. 
The federal revenue-sharing block grants and state aid to local general governments or 
school districts in many states are examples of these types of grants. 
c. (Closed-end) categorical grants 
While the forgoing arguments have played a role in the development of central 
government grant programs, a political or institutional justification has probably played an 
even more important role in most developed countries. There are some good democratic 
reasons to try to keep power close to the people by having strong and vigorous local 
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governments. At the same time, high-level or central governments have tried to establish the 
minimum service or spending levels for government-provided goods or services. A reasonable 
way to compromise these partially conflicting objectives is for the central government to give 
(closed-end) categorical grants to local governments. This preserves local control over the 
relevant functional category of expenditures, yet allows the central government to upgrade 
local spending. While it is reasonable to expect that some portion of categorical grants will 
support the services for which they were intended, some will be used to release resources for 
spending on other public goods or services, and some will be used to reduce the tax burden by 
replacing state-local funding that would have been provided. The exact distribution will be 
difficult to ascertain because of impossibility of separating expenditures on the intended 
category or services fi-om those for other services in the area intended where such categories 
are not readily separable. 
However, by nature of the objective of the grants, a closed-end grant does not allow 
the local government as much freedom as an open-end price reduction grant, and the central 
government maintains control over its own budget by limiting the total amount of funds 
available to local governments. Thus, the central government typically establishes rather tight 
conditions on the uses to which the money can be put and the degree to which local 
governments can cut back other spending. These grants may be regarded as a device by which 
local governments are acting as the agents, contractors, or fiscal partners for the central 
government in carrying out the specified tasks. 
The closed-end categorical grants are affecting both income and/or relative prices 
facing lower levels of government. As long as the community operates within the budget 
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constrmnt set by the matching program, the grant has a price effect. However, if the 
community spends all the money available from the grant or there is no matching requirement, 
then the analysis is the same as the above unconditional grants. The response of expenditures 
to these grants would show somewhat the intermediate possibility. Traditionally, the most 
important type of grants at the federal level have been the closed-end conditional grants in 
such areas as highways, health, education, manpower, and the environment. State 
governments also provide categorical grants to local agencies that are tied to specific 
programs or services in education. 
This simplistic view of the effect of grants might be flawed since it assumes that the 
indifference curve reflects interests of the decisive voter or agency (manager) and that they are 
identical to the interests of other constituents in the community. Thus, the model described 
above is likely to be a poor predictor of government spending behavior, at least in the short 
run. After all, the simple model predicts that a dollar increase in grants has the same effect as a 
dollar increase in community income. However, grants often lead to a greater spending 
increase than would result from an equivalent increase in community income. This 
phenomenon is called the "flypaper effect," since it describes the situation in which money 
tends to stick where it initially hits. 
To summarize, higher-level governments use a different set of grant types to increase 
the provision of public goods or services by lower-level governments. Each has the potential 
for increasing the amount of specific types of goods or services that are produced, but each 
also has the potential for supporting the provision of other public goods or reducing local tax 
burden. 
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2. Types of grants in public education 
a. General state aid 
Most state aid to local school districts is unrestricted aid for general-purpose support 
of current operations. There are also a variety of categorical grant programs providing aid for 
particular groups of children or types of school services. Nearly all aid funds, both general-
purpose or categorical, are distributed among districts according to formulas written in state 
law. There is very little discretionary funding. 
Flat grant In most states, general state aid is provided in lump sum form. That is, 
the amount of aid to which a district is entitled does not depend on the district's own fiscal 
decisions. Some general aid is provided to all local educational agencies in the form of so-
called population membership grants or average daily attendance (ADA) grants, or flat grants. 
The state provides a flat amount of grant assistance for each child attending the school district 
or in average daily attendance. 
Foundation program or equalization grants But most states have developed lump 
sum formulas with equalizing properties. This means that the amount of aid per pupil varies 
from one district to another according to some measure of each district's own ability to raise 
revenue for its schools. Since property taxes are the main source of local revenue, the measure 
of local ability is usually the amount of assessed property value per pupil (the local tax base). 
A few states, however, use other wealth indexes. Under the most commonly used equalization 
scheme, known as the foundation formula, the amount of aid per pupil to which a district is 
entitled decreases linearly as a function of the local tax base, within upper and lower bounds. 
Percentage equalization In some states, lump sum grant formulas have been 
supplanted by systems, namely percentage equalization formulas, in which the state matches 
school revenue raised locally. Each local school district establishes its own expenditure level 
within state limits, and the state equalizes the expenditure by providing state funds based on 
the district's relative fiscal capacity. Thus, whereas the foundation program is a fixed unit 
formula, the percentage equalization is a variable unit formula. With the form of variable 
formula, the matching rate decreases linearly, within the state limits, as a function of a 
district's assessed property value per pupil. Since the formula was first advanced seriously in 
1922, only seven states have adopted it for use as a basic aid formula: Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
District power equalization District power equalization is a method of equalizing 
tax bases so that all school pupils will have access to the same resources or face the equalized 
per pupil revenue among school districts even though the tax base per pupil may differ. It 
premises the removal of wealth as a determinant of the use of local school revenues, to 
equalize completely tax resources among all school districts. In theory, there is no difference 
between the foundation program and percentage equalization, because if both were geared to 
the wealthiest district in the state as the key district, then full equalization would take place. 
However, the practicality of financing has never allowed this to happen, because to level-up to 
the richest requires an inordinate amount of tax resources in most states. Only Wisconsin 
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enacted this plan in 1973, but it was short-lived because the recapture provision was held to 
be unconstitutional by the Wisconsin Supreme Court before the law became effective. 
b. State categorical aid 
State categorical grant programs provide special-purpose aid for designated groups of 
pupils (e.g., handicapped, gifted, or disadvantaged children), for specific educational programs 
(e.g., vocational education or bilingual education), and for specific school district fiinctions 
(e.g., pupil transportation or school construction). Most of this aid is distributed according to 
formulas that reflect the need for the category in question (e.g., number of pupils in each 
designated category) and/or the cost of providing the service (e.g., actual expense of pupil 
transportation). 
c. Federal aid 
Unlike state aid, most federal aid is earmarked for specific purposes. The largest 
federal categorical grant programs have been for compensatory education, vocational 
education, education of the handicapped, preschool education ("Head Start"), and innovative 
projects. On the other hand, the only large, federal general-purpose aid program is the aid to 
"federally impacted areas," which distributes general-purpose fijnds on the basis of the number 
of children of federal employees in a district. Another difference between federal and state aid 
is that most federal aid is not distributed directly to districts by formula. Rather, a typical 
arrangement is to allocate aid among states by formula. Then, on a project-by-project base. 
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aid is distributed to eligible districts that submit applications. There are considerable variations 
in arrangements from one program to another. 
The federal government has restricted its use of matching grants to a portion of its 
vocational education grants to the states. The main theoretical advantage of matching grants is 
their eflSciency in tying the assistance to increased provision of a service that is of national 
concern. From the point of view of the individual district, however, federal aid in neariy all 
cases takes the form of a categorical lump sum grant. 
C. Intergovernmental Grants-in-Aid for Education 
1. The policy relevance of the impact of grants-in-aid 
The reason that intergovernmental grants are so important in school finance is that they are 
the main instruments by which state and federal authorities can influence the level, distribution, and 
utilization of educational resources. Changes in an existing grant system, either amount or form, 
are usually proposed with one or more of the following objectives in mind: (a) to increase 
aggregate or average school support, (b) to provide tax relief to local property taxpayers, (c) to 
modify the distribution of educational resources among districts, to reduce disparities, or (d) to 
direct resources to specific educational activities of special interest to the aid grantor. 
A study of grant impact is, in essence, an inquiry into the local response to changes in the 
amount or the form of aid. With their fiscal autonomy and access to a local revenue source, local 
school districts are able to respond adaptively to any changes in external financial support. Their 
adaptive behavior may include raising or lowering the amount of revenue they obtained internally 
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by raising or lowering the property tax rate, and raising or lowering the amount of non-grant funds 
allocated to the categorically aided function in response to the change in categorical grant. These 
induced changes may or may not be compatible with the grantor's objectives. In general, unless the 
local response is anticipated correctly and allowed for in establishing state and federal aid policy, 
the outcome may be quite diflFerent from what the grantor intended. In the following section, the 
impact of intergovernmental grants on educational expenditure is assessed by reviewing and 
synthesizing the empirical literature on the subject.' 
2. Review and synthesis of the empirical literature 
There are two kinds of studies that set out to evaluate the impact of intergovernmental 
grants on educational spending. The first restricts its focus to the determinants of educational 
expenditures only, while the second considers the determinants of total state and local 
government expenditures and for several selected subcategories including education.^ Both 
kinds of studies on education are included here. These studies focus on different types of 
government units, ar4~empioying different methodologies. They include both cross-sectional 
and time series studies.^ 
The earlier studies are characterized by the "determinants" approach to the study of 
educational expenditures of state and local governments. The typical determinants study 
consists of a single-equation regression model explaining educational expenditures" on a per 
capita or per pupil base in terms of some independent variables, including intergovernmental 
grants, income, population density, property wealth, and others. Using a least squares 
estimation technique, they generally have shown strong and significant effects of 
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intergovernmental grants. However, the precise findings from these studies should not be 
accepted without considering the possible biases created by their conceptual and statistical 
problems. A common problem has been the lack of an adequate theory of the underlying fiscal 
behavior of state and local governments. The lack of an adequate theory behind the regression 
model makes it difficult for the researcher to determine the causal relationships among the 
variables. Many studies also have not attempted to distinguish the effects of different types of 
grants. Since different types of grants tend to have different impacts on the level of 
educational spending, the design of an intergovernmental grant scheme must take into account 
the form of grant. Moreover, since most of these are cross-sectional studies for a single year, 
the results might not be applicable in predicting the spending behavior of local governments or 
school districts over time. 
Studies since the late 1960s have paid more attention to those problems than earlier 
works. In these studies, some theoretical consideration has been given to the spending and 
taxing behavior of local governmental units. Some of these latter studies have set up a system 
of simultaneous equations that recognize explicitly the interplay of supply and demand forces 
affecting educational expenditures. A two-stage least squares procedure is then used to 
estimate the impact of various factors affecting the level of educational expenditures. Some 
authors also have chosen to specify an educational demand function based on a median voter, 
majority rule model. Voting models have been most popular in the applied public demand and 
grant literature. Others have constructed a bureaucratic model, or budget maximization 
model. This is a utility maximization model that depicts a government unit or a bureaucrat as 
seeking to maximize the welfare of its constituents subject to some fiscal constraints (Barro 
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1972, Johnson 1979, Niskanen 1971). Others have proposed interest group models that view 
the social decision process as serving the needs of a particular power group in the 
community.' Besides making an effort to model more adequately the spending and taxing 
behavior of local governmental units, some of the studies also have attempted to differentiate 
the eflfects of different types of grants. 
Since the results of a cross-sectional analysis are inadequate for predicting the 
spending behavior of a local government over time, because long-period time series data are 
either expensive or difficult to obtain, some authors have tried different statistical methods to 
deal with this problem. One method is to combine cross-sectional data for several years into a 
pooled cross-sectional, time series form of statistical analysis. Pooling the data for several 
years together generates more variance in the data set for statistical analysis. Another method 
is the "change" analysis, which uses data in "change" form. That is, changes in expenditure 
levels between two selected years are related to changes in explanatory variables between the 
two years (Adams 1979). In short, compared to earlier ones, later studies have used more 
elaborate models of the fiscal behavior of state and local governments and have employed 
more sophisticated statistical techniques in their empirical estimation of the impact of 
intergovernmental grants on educational spending. 
In general, the numerous previously published studies reviewed in this study have 
found significant effects of several factors on educational expenditures. Total educational 
expenditure is related positively to intergovernmental grants for education, related negatively 
to the price of education services faced by a local district, and directly related to the level of 
income or property wealth. The level of educational expenditure also is affected by the 
19 
composition of the local tax base; a district with a lower proportion of residential property 
(and a higher proportion of commercial property) tends to spend more on education. Other 
commonly-used variables that have been found to be important are the age composition of the 
population, population density, and the extent of urbanization of the region.® 
In the sections that follow, empirical studies are grouped into two categories: studies 
of state grants to local governments or school districts, and studies of federal grants to state 
and local governments. Each study will be introduced with the specific problem it addresses, 
the model constructed, and the statistical procedure used. Since the focus is on the 
intergovernmental grant variable, primary emphasis is given to an examination of the empirical 
effects of different types of intergovernmental grants on educational expenditure. 
a. State grants and educational expenditure 
State governments long have been a major source of funding for education, and, as 
discussed earlier, most state education grants have been awarded to local governments or 
school districts in the form of foundation or equalization grants. The states also provide 
general aid in the form of flat grants based on population membership or average daily 
attendance (ADA). Both foundation grants and flat grants essentially are unrestricted block 
grants. There also are state categorical grants in many states, but they are nominal relative to 
foundation or flat grants. 
The studies of state grants reviewed here have used total educational expenditure per 
pupil or per capita as the dependent variable, except for Stem (1973), Bowman (1974), Grubb 
and Michelson (1974), and Cohn (1974). Stem, Grubb and Michelson, and Cohn have used 
locally financed educational expenditure as the dependent variable, while Bowman has used 
school district tax. 
The studies can be divided into three subgroups: (a) studies of the impact of state 
grants on educational expenditures by state governments (Renshaw 1960, Sacks and Harris 
1964, McMahon 1970, and Cohn 1974), (b) studies of the impact of state grants on 
educational expenditures of cities and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) 
(Brazer 1959, Bishop 1964, Sacks and Ranney 1966, Campbell and Sacks 1967, Pidot 1969, 
Hu and Booms 1971, Sacks, Ranney and Andrew 1972, and Weicher 1972), and (c) studies of 
the impact of state grants on school district educational expenditures. However, the first two 
groups of studies are not presented here. A limitation of the first group of studies is that their 
state-level data are too highly aggregated. Decisions about expenditures, school size, 
enrollments, and other education-related issues are made usually at local levels (school 
districts, cities, and counties). Thus, to understand the behavioral patterns of local education 
organizations, one has to analyze data for local educational units rather than state aggregates. 
The second group studied the educational expenditure patterns of cities and SMSAs. 
Education is one of several functions of a city government, but it is the major fijnction of a 
school district. Thus, decisions of a school-district government regarding educational 
expenditures are likely to take place in an environment different from that of a city 
government. For these reasons, these two groups of studies are omitted here. 
Table 2-1 summarizes empirical studies on the impact of state grants for educational 
expenditures of school districts. All estimates presented here are statistically significant at the 
5% level unless stated otherwise. One early study, by Miner (1963), considered the 
Table 2-1. Empirical studies of the impact of state grants on school district educational expenditures 
Study Data (cross-sectionai 
unless stated otherwise) 
Dependent variable 
(educational expenditure, E) 
Independent variable 
(grant,G) 
Response 
(marginal change, dE/dG) 
Adams school districts in 
(1979) Maryland, 1972 to 1976 
(pooled data) 
school districts in Kansas, 
1973 to 1975 (pooled 
data) 
school districts in 
Colorado, 1977 
school districts in 
Wisconsin, 1973-1974 
and 1975-1976 (pooled 
data) 
Adams school districts in New 
(1980) York, 1976-1977 
Addonizio 345 school districts in 
(1991) Michigan, 1982-1983 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil State block grant for 
education 
per pupil State education categorical 
grant 
per pupil state education categorical 
grant 
per pupil total expenditure price of education services 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil state education categorical 
grant 
price of education services 
per pupil state education categorical 
grant 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
per pupil state education categorical 
grant 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
price of education services 
between 0.6 and 0.7 
(elasticity=0.157) 
0.7 (elasticity=0.074) 
0.5 (elasticity=0.039) 
elasticity=between -0.09 
and -0.08, insignificant 
0.17 (elasticity=between 
0.021 and 0.019) 
elasticity=between -0.22 
and -0.19 
1.7 (elasticity=between 
0.063 and 0.086) 
0.59 
1.06 
between 2.28 and 2.36 for 
in-formula districts 
elasticity=between -0.09 
and -0.11 (forin-
GTB-fomiula) 
elasticity=between -0.24 
and -0.36 (for out-of 
-formula) 
Table 2-1. (Continued) 
Study Data (cross-sectional Dependent variable 
unless stated otherwise) (educational expenditure, E) 
Black, school districts in per pupil total expenditure 
Lewis, & Delaware, 1970-1973 
Link (pooled data) 
(1979) 
Bowman 55 countywide per pupil school districts tax 
(1974) independent school 
districts in West Virginia, 
1969-1970 
Cohn 67 counties in per pupil locally financed 
(1974) Pennsylvania, 1970 expenditure 
Feldstein 105 towns in per pupil total town 
(1975) Massachusetts, 1970 expenditure 
per pupil total town 
expenditure 
Grubb & 159 school districts in per pupil locally financed 
Michelson Massachusetts, 1968- expenditure 
(1974) 1969 
Grubb & 234 unified school per pupil total expenditure 
Osman districts in California, 
(1977) 1971-1972 
Independent variable 
(grant,G) 
Response 
(marginal change, dE/dG) 
per pupil state block grant for 0.77 (elasticity=0.66) 
education 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
per pupil state grant for education 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
price of education services 
tax decreases by 50 cents 
per dollar of grant 
(elasticity=-0.803) 
-0.12, significant at 10% 
level 
0.6 (elasticity=0.066) 
price elasticity= -1.0 
per pupil state block grant for -0.74, insignificant 
education 
per pupil state education categorical 1.21, significant at 10% 
grant level 
price of education services elasticity=0.5, 
insignificant 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
0.78 
Table 2-1. (Continued) 
Study Data (cross-sectional 
unless stated otherwise) 
Dependent variable 
(educational expenditure, E) 
Ladd 78 communities in 
(1975) Massachusetts, 1970 
Megdal 177 school districts in 
(1984) New Jersey, 1970, 1974 
and 1977 
(pooled data) 
Miner 1127 school districts in 23 
(1963) states, 1959-1960 
Park & 451 school districts in 
Carroll Michigan, 1971 to 1976 
(1979) (pooled data) 
per pupil total community 
expenditure 
per pupil total community 
expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
less tuition revenue 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
Perkins 112 communities in 
(1984) Massachusetts, 1970 
per pupil total community 
expenditure 
307 communities in 
Massachusetts, 1970, 
1973, 1975 and 1976 
(pooled data) 
per pupil total community 
expenditure 
Independent variable 
(grant,G) 
Response 
(marginal change, dE/dG) 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
price of education services 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
price of education services 
0.5 (elasticity=0.03) 
price elasticity=between 
-0.65 and -0.49 
elasticity = -0.06 
elasticity = -0.28 
state educational aid as a percentage negatively related 
of total educational expenditure 
per pupil state block grant for 0.06 (elasticity=0.005) 
education 
per pupil state education categorical 0.32 (elasticity=0.017) 
grant 
price of education services 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
price of education services 
-0.02 
elasticity = 0.013 
elasticity = -0.704 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
price of education services 
elasticity = 0.01 (OLS) 
elasticity = 0.01 (dummy 
variable model) 
elasticity = -0.65 (OLS) 
elasticity = -0.56 (dummy 
variable model) 
Table 2-1. (Continued) 
Study Data (cross-sectional 
unless stated otherwise) 
Dependent variable 
(educational expenditure, E) 
Independent variable 
(grant,G) 
Response 
(marginal change, dE/dG) 
Stem 157 school districts in 
(1973) Massachusetts, 1968-
1969 
per pupil locally financed 
expenditure 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
between -0.55 and -0.45 
Struyk 
(1970) 
Vincent & 
Adams 
(1978) 
140 school districts in 
New Jersey, 1965-1966 
school districts in 
Colorado, 1973 and 1975 
school districts in 
Minnesota, 1972 and 
1976 
per pupil total expenditure per pupil state aid 
per pupil total expenditure 
change in per pupil total 
expenditure between 1975 and 
1973 
per pupil total c.xpenditure 
change in per pupil total 
expenditure between 1976 and 
1972 
per pupil total expenditure 
change in per pupil total 
expenditure between 1976 and 
1972 
per pupil state education categorical 
grant 
change in per pupil state education 
categorical grant between 1975 and 
1973 
per pupil state block grant for 
education 
change in per pupil state block grant 
for education between 1976 jmd 
1972 
per pupil state education categorical 
grant 
change in per pupil state education 
categorical grant between 1976 and 
1972 
0.65, insignificant 
1.6 for 1973 
1.8 for 1975 
0.85 
0.41 for 1972 
0.28 for 1976 
0.49 
1.33 for 1972 
1.07 for 1976 
0.80 
determinants of the per pupil educational expenditures in 1,127 school districts in 23 states. 
Taking into account factors relevant to the demand for education (e.g., percent school-aged 
children in the population of a school district), the supply of education (e.g., salary of 
teachers), and variables reflecting the legal difference among districts in various states (e.g., 
types of grants, state education as a proportion of total educational expenditure). Miner 
constructed a single-equation model relating per pupil total educational expenditure to more 
than a dozen independent variables. He found that per pupil total educational expenditure was 
negatively related to state education aid as a proportion of total educational expenditure. This 
result is consistent with the fact that poorer districts have lower levels of educational 
expenditure though they receive relatively more aid than wealthier districts. 
Later studies have concentrated on analyzing interstate school district spending 
behavior. While the studies discussed so far have used total educational expenditure as the 
dependent variable, some of the studies in Table 2-1 have turned to other dependent variables 
such as locally financed educational expenditure and local school tax. Struyk (1970) studied 
the effects of state aid on the provision of education and welfare services of 140 school 
districts in New Jersey. His approach was to modify Gramlich's (1968) model to specify state 
aid as an endogenous variable, so as to take into account the possible joint determination of 
state aid and local expenditure. Using a TSLS technique and data for 1965-1966 school year, 
he found that for every additional dollar of state aid to education, a school district in New 
Jersey seemed to increase its educational spending by 65 cents. 
Stem (1973) analyzed the spending behavior of 157 school districts in Massachusetts 
using 1968-1969 data. Assuming that local school authorities will show some consistency in 
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evaluating different combinations of local tax rates and educational expenditure when the state 
aid formula changes, he specified a preference function for local school boards including 
sociodemographic factors, school tax rate, and locally financed educational expenditure. 
Assuming that a school board will maximize its preference function with respect to the single 
control variable of locally financed educational expenditure, Stem derived an equation relating 
locally financed educational expenditure to a number of explanatory variables including state 
block grants for education, community income, and other sociodemographic factors. 
Regression analysis indicates that for every additional dollar of state education block grant 
received, a school board will reduce locally financed educational expenditure by 45 to 55 
cents. In other words, total educational expenditure will increase by 45 to 55 cents.^ Having 
estimated the parameters in the preference function. Stern subsequently used the fijnction to 
simulate the effects of a power equalization formula. He found that power equalization grants 
would reduce the disparities in educational expenditures among school districts due to 
property value differences associated with socioeconomic status. 
Grubb and Michelson (1974) also studied the educational expenditures of 
Massachusetts school districts. In their study, they applied several models (a utility function 
specification, a linear additive specification, a log-linear specification, and a linear expenditure 
function) of spending behavior of school districts, and found that the results differed 
significantly among the models. For unrestricted education block grants, they found that 
locally financed educational expenditure would decrease by an amount between 19 cents and 
$1.18 for every additional dollar of such grants. The elasticity of locally financed educational 
expenditure with respect to the price of education services ranged between 0.14 and 1.2. 
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When a linear, additive relationship between locally financed educational expenditure and a 
number of explanatory variables was used, they found that for every additional dollar of state 
education block grants received, locally financed educational expenditure would decrease by 
74 cents, which means that total educational expenditure increases by 26 cents. The effect of 
state education categorical grants, however, was found to be stimulative. Locally financed 
educational expenditure would increase by $1.21 for every additional dollar of state education 
categorical grants. They also found that the elasticity of locally financed educational 
expenditure with respect to the price of education services was 0.5, but was not significant 
statistically. 
Feldstein (1975) and Ladd (1975) also studied the Massachusetts school districts. 
Feldstein specified a log-linear relationship between total educational expenditure and a 
number of explanatory variables including state educational block grants, property wealth, 
price of education service, and others. For various forms of the log-linear expenditure fianction 
and different sets of data, he found that the elasticity of total educational expenditure with 
respect to the price of education service ranged from -1.6 to -0.94. For the 1970 cross-
sectional data, the estimated price elasticity was -1.0; the elasticity of total educational 
expenditure with respect to the state block grant was 0.066, which corresponded to a 
marginal propensity to consume such funds of approximately 0.6. But he pointed out that 0.6 
would be biased upward, because in 1970 most block grants were paid to towns that passed 
the limit of matching aid, so that block grants were endogenous. 
Feldstein was concerned with how to finance local education to neutralize the effects 
of differences in local wealth without sacrificing local choice. He developed a theoretical 
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model to produce a means of achieving "wealth neutrality," that is, a condition whereby per 
pupil educational expenditure of a district is not related to a measure of local wealth that 
emphasizes property value, income, and other aspects of community wealth. This involves 
selecting the proper matching rate parameter so that the elasticity of total educational 
expenditure with respect to wealth is zero. His analysis of the educational expenditure of 
Massachusetts towns and communities suggests that matching grants may be used towards 
achieving wealth neutrality. 
Ladd (1975) analyzed the 1970 data for 78 communities in the Boston SMSA. Using a 
log-linear equation relating total educational expenditure and a number of explanatory 
variables, she found that the estimated price elasticity associated with state matching grants 
for education ranged between -0.65 and -0.49. The elasticity for state education block grants 
was around 0.03, and the elasticity for total intergovernmental education categorical aid (state 
plus federal categorical aid for education) was 0.11 (the implied marginal propensities to 
spend were 0.5 and 1.1, respectively). Ladd's emphasis in the study was to show that the 
composition of the property tax base would affect local decisions to provide educational 
services. She found that a district with a higher proportion of residential property (thus a 
lower proportion of commercial and industrial property) would tend to spend less on 
education. The tendency of a highly residential community to spend less may be because 
residential taxpayer voters will share a larger portion of the tax burden for additional spending 
than in a community whose tax base is much more heavily commercial and industrial. She also 
found that commercial property had more strongly positive effect than industrial property on 
educational expenditure. 
The substitutive-stimulative effect of state aid on the educational expenditures of 
school districts is supported further by Cohn (1974) and Bowman (1974). Cohn focused his 
attention on 67 counties in Pennsylvania and used a model developed by Clyde (1973). The 
Clyde model consists of a system of simultaneous equations relating four endogenous 
variables to a number of exogenous variables (one of them being the state education grant). 
One of the endogenous variables was per pupil locally financed expenditure. Using the TSLS 
procedure, Cohn found that for every additional dollar of state education grants received, a 
county will reduce its own educational expenditure by 12 cents. In other words, total 
educational expenditure will increase by 88 cents. He pointed out that the result indicated a 
higher stimulative effect for state education grants in this intrastate study than that found in his 
interstate study (see Table 2-1). He noted that, while the majority of the states in the country 
use foundation grants, Pennsylvania is one of the few states that use a percentage equalization 
grant scheme. He suggested, though he could not prove, that the latter scheme might be more 
stimulative than the former scheme. 
In studying the effect of state education grants on educational expenditures. Bowman 
(1974) approached the problem from another direction. Instead of finding the change in 
educational expenditure per dollar of state education aid, he considered the relation between 
state education aid and the amount of school tax raised to fund education. He found that for 
every additional dollar of state education aid received, a school district will lower its tax by 50 
cents. His result supports the commonly held view that a local government will use part of 
the state aid to reduce its taxes. 
Black, Lewis and Link (1979), and Grubb and Osman (1977) both considered the 
impact of state education block grants on the total educational expenditure of school districts. 
Black et al. analyzed pooled data for the 23 regular school districts in Delaware. The study 
shows that a Delaware school district will increase total educational expenditure by 77 cents 
per additional dollar of state education block grants received. This resuk is quite close to that 
of Grubb and Osman, who found a coefficient of 78 cents per dollar of state aid for California 
unified school districts. 
The study by Park and Carroll (1979) of 451 school districts in Michigan, however, 
indicates a much lower response of school districts to state education aid. They found that a 
Michigan school district would increase its total educational expenditure by only 6 cents and 
32 cents per additional dollar of state education block grants and state education categorical 
grants received, respectively. For state education matching grants, their estimate of price 
elasticity was -0.02, much smaller than those estimated by Feldstein and Ladd. Such a low 
price elasticity implies that a matching grant will not be stimulative. 
Vincent and Adams (1978) investigated the fiscal response of school districts in two 
states, Colorado and Minnesota using 1973 and 1975 data for Colorado and 1972 and 1976 
data for Minnesota. They carried out a one-year, cross-sectional study, as well as an analysis 
for each state explaining changes between the two years of each data set. For Minnesota, they 
found that total educational expenditure per pupil would increase by 41 cents and 28 cents for 
each additional dollar of state education block grants received in 1972 and 1976, respectively. 
This implies that Minnesota school districts on the average used an extra dollar of state 
education block grants to reduce local taxes by 59 cents and 72 cents in 1972 and 1976, 
respectively. In the change analysis, they related changes in total educational expenditures 
between the two years to changes in the explanatory variables over that period. They found 
that school districts would spend an additional 49 cents for every additional dollar of state 
education block grant received. This suggested that the property tax reduction impact may be 
somewhat lower over time than the impact that could be inferred from the one-year, cross-
sectional analysis. As for state categorical grants for education, the coefficient was 1.33 for 
1972 and 1.07 for 1976. The change analysis yielded a coefficient of 0.80, indicating that 
some substitution over time of state educational categorical aid for local property taxes may 
be indicated by the cross-sectional analysis. Similarly, for Colorado school districts, the 
coefficient for state categorical grants for education was 1.6 and 1.8 for 1973 and 1975, 
respectively. The analysis for changes between 1973 and 1975 yielded a coefficient of 0.85. 
Adams (1979,1980) continued her study of the fiscal responses of school districts in 
several other states. In her 1979 study, she found that the estimated elasticities of total 
educational expenditure with respected to the price of education service was quite small 
compared to those reported by Feldstein and Ladd, but closer to the results of Park and 
Carroll. For school districts in Colorado, the estimated price elasticity ranged between -0.09 
and -0.08; for Wisconsin school districts, it was between -0.22 and -0.19. For state education 
categorical grants, the estimated marginal propensity to spend was 0.17 for Colorado, 0.5 for 
Kansas, 0.7 for Maryland, and close to 1.7 for Wisconsin. The estimated marginal propensity 
to spend out of foundation grants was in the range 0.6 and 0.7 for school districts in Maryland 
between 1972 and 1976. 
She also found out that other components of a school aid structure, such as the nature 
and scope of spending limitation, and/or the differential treatment of districts on the basis of 
size or other criteria, could affect the impact of a state education grant. She cited the results 
for Colorado and Wisconsin, two reform states that have adopted equalization reforms in 
educational finance which use a Guaranteed Tax Base Formula (GTB). 
In her 1980 study of New York state school districts, Adams found that, on average, 
total educational expenditure would increase by 59 cents for each additional dollar of state 
education block grants received, and by $1.06 for each additional dollar of state categorical 
grants awarded by the state government. However, she found that the marginal propensity to 
spend out of a state education block grant differs between upstate school districts (0.68) and 
downstate school districts (0.05). The results also indicate that downstate school districts tend 
to spend more out of additional dollars of personal income for education services than upstate 
school districts. This suggests that the individual characteristics of school districts affect the 
fiscal response to state aid, and any statistical analysis of average behavior may differ 
significantly from individual district behavior. She also considered two other issues; prices of 
school inputs and effects of noneducation services on educational expenditures. Since the 
prices of school inputs vary among school districts, nominal educational expenditure may not 
reflect the real level of education services provided. Using an index of the variation of input 
prices for New York school districts developed by Wendling (1980), she adjusted nominal 
total educational expenditure into "real" total educational expenditure. She found that the 
analysis of nominal total educational expenditure indicated that a percent increase in general 
state aid would increase nominal total educational expenditure by 0.07 percent. However, 
when total educational expenditure was analyzed in real dollars, the response measure was 
lower, only 0.04 percent. She also found that total educational expenditure was positively 
related to expenditure on noneducation services. 
Perkins (1984) studied the Massachusetts school districts. Following Feldstein's 
(1975) log-linear expenditure equation, total educational expenditure was related to property 
wealth, price of education service, state block grant, and other variables which reflect 
community resources and characteristics. He found that both elasticities of total educational 
expenditure with respect to the price of education service and with respect to state block grant 
were lower than Feldstein's. For the 1970 cross-section data of 112 communities, the 
estimated price elasticity was -0.70, and the elasticity of state block grants was 0.013. For the 
pooled data of 307 communities for 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1976, the price elasticity was 
-0.65 for OLS and -0.56 for a fixed-coefficient or dummy variable model. The elasticity of 
state block grant was 0.01 for both models. Thus, the price elasticity estimates were inelastic. 
Income elasticity was also everywhere inelastic, ranging from 0.411 to 0.832. Hence, he 
challenged the Feldstein's argument that complete wealth neutrality can be achieved with 
matching grants that involve a relatively low elasticity of price with respect to wealth. He 
derived the wealth neutrality measure, and concluded that the elastic response to price 
movements suggest that the grant scheme proposed by Feldstein could not effectively 
neutralize the influence of wealth in local education spending. Moreover, he said the large 
variations across communities in matching rates required by Feldstein's policy suggest 
substantial price distortions that in turn may increase economic inefficiency. 
Megdal (1984) analyzed the pooled data of 1970, 1974, and 1977 for 177 school 
districts in New Jersey. She used a log-linear median voter model relating total current 
expenditure less tuition revenue to median income, price of education service, total state and 
federal categorical aid, state block aid, equalized residential value as a wealth variable, 
enrollment increase, and other variables that represent community characteristics. Using OLS, 
she found that the estimated price elasticity associated with state matching aid was 
-0.28, which is very inelastic. She suggested that a program of matching grants would have to 
result in a sizable decrease in the perceived price of education if it is to produce an even 
modest increase in expenditures. Hence, she concluded that a program of matching grants 
might not be successful in stimulating expenditures in order to meet equity goals in school 
finance. The elasticity of total expenditure with respect to state block grants for the pooled 
sample was -0.06, which is statistically significant. This was an unintuitive result, but she 
suggested that there could be uncertainty as to the fiiture aid situation, since there had been a 
transition period for the aid formula and it was doubtfial that the current aid formula would 
remain in effect. Therefore, districts might have resisted increasing spending in response to aid 
revenues so as to avoid large future tax increase should the aid formula change significantly. 
Addonizio (1991) recently studied 345 school districts in Michigan for the 1982-1983 
school year. He used weighted least squares to estimate total expenditure as a flincition of 
price of education service, median income, state block grant, federal block grant, percentage 
of private school enrollment, an index of teacher salaries, and other variables. Since the state 
of Michigan provided the Guaranteed Tax Base (GTB) school-aid formula and adopted a 
Homestead Property Tax Credit program, known as a "circuit breaker," he proposed four 
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different tax price equations. The estimated price elasticity ranged -0.09 to -0.01 for in-
formula districts and -0.24 to -0.36 for out-of-formula districts. He showed that after 
adjusting for circuit breaker income tax credits, the price effects of the GTB formula are more 
than offset by the countering effects of the circuit breaker and the disparities in local property 
wealth. He found that an additional dollar of state education block grants was very stimulative 
and would increase total educational expenditure of in-formula school districts by $2.28 to 
$2.36, depending on the price equations, whereas for out-of-formula districts it was not 
statistically significant at all. This result differed substantially compared to Park and Carroll 
(1979), who showed a not-so-stimulative result, but he cautioned that this should not be 
interpreted as proof that such grants would succeed in stimulating low-spending districts if 
used more extensively. 
b. Federal grants and educational expenditure 
Though federal involvement in education has been increasing since the passage of the 
1965 Elementary and Secondary School Act, its significance has been relatively modest 
compared to state and local involvement. Most of the federal grants for education take the 
form of categorical grants targeted for specialized education programs. The largest grant has 
been provided by Title 1 of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965, which 
provides compensatory education for children from low-income families. Open-end matching 
education grants have not been used commonly by the federal government. 
A number of studies on federal grants for education are reviewed here. They are 
divided into two groups and are presented in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3. Table 2-2 consists of 
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studies that used data before 1966, a period in which federal involvement in education was 
minimal. Table 2-3 consists of the studies that have used data after 1965. Because grants to 
Title 1 programs constitute a large portion of federal education aid to state and local 
governments, some of the studies in Table 2-3 have chosen to divide federal education aid into 
two parts: Title 1 grants, and non-Title 1 federal education grants. The effects of these two 
parts of aid are considered separately. The estimates presented in these two tables are 
statistically significant at the 5% level unless stated otherwise. 
Another type of federal grant to state and local governments that will affect 
educational spending is general revenue sharing (GRS). However, as mentioned earlier, it 
should not be viewed as a system of grants to support any particular public service like 
education. The specific effects of revenue sharing on educational spending depend crucially on 
the relative preferences of state and local governments receiving GRS grants for using 
additional revenues on education as opposed to other public goods. Thus, studies of the 
impact of revenue sharing are not presented here.^ 
First, consider the studies in Table 2-2. Osman (1966) obtained a large and statistically 
significant coefficient for federal education grants (the 5.11 marginal propensity). In his cross-
sectional study, he argued that federal grants to other noneducation fiinctions also would 
affect educational expenditures because funds from these federally-aided, noneducation 
fiinctions might be released for use in education. Thus, in his one-equation model, total 
educational expenditure was made a function of per capita income, number of students 
attending local public schools per 1,000 of state population, federal grants for education, as 
well as federal grants to noneducation fijnctions. He found that the effects of noneducation 
Table 2-2. Empirical studies of the impact of federal aid on state and local educational expenditures, studies using data before 1966 
Study Data (cross-sectional Dependent variable Independent variable Response 
unless stated otherwise) (educational expenditure, E) (grant,G) (marginal change, dE/dG) 
Booms & 50 states, 1960 per capita total state-local per capita federal aid 1.68 
Hu(1971) expenditure 
O'Brien 48 states, 1958-1966 per capita state-local per capita federal education aid 0.67 
(1971) (pooled data) expenditure from own funds 
Osman 48 states, 1960 per capita total expenditure of per capita federal education aid 5.1 
(1966) state 
Pidot 81 largest SMS As in per capita SMSA total per capita federal aid 0.13, insignificant 
(1969) 1962 expenditure 
Pogue& 48 states, 1958-1964 per capita total expenditure for per capita federal education aid -0.25 to 1.72 
Sgontz (pooled data) local education per capita federal education aid 
(1968) per capita total expenditure for 3.0 to 4.9 
all levels of education 
Smith 50 states, 1965 per capita state-local expenditure per capita federal education aid 0.69, insignificant 
(1968) own funds 
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federal grants on total educational expenditure was statistically significant, and the coefficient 
was positive. 
Pogue and Sgontz (1968) questioned Osman's finding that federal grants were purely 
stimulative. In their study, they analyzed expenditure for all levels of education and 
expenditure of local schools in 48 states for a period of 7 years, 1958-1964. The impact of 
federal education grants was found to be different for these two kinds of expenditure. For 
local school expenditure, the coefficients for federal education grants for the 7 years were, 
respectively, -0.25, 1.22, 1.23,1.17, 0.10, 1.18, and 1.72. None of these coefficients was 
statistically greater than 1.0. Thus federal education grants are not necessarily purely 
stimulative. For expenditure on all levels of education, the coefficients for federal education 
grants for the 7-year period were 3.83, 4.92, 4.19, 4.61, 2.99, 3.36, and 4.33. All except the 
first value (3.83) were greater statistically than 1.0 at the 5 percent level. The fluctuating 
values of the coefficients for federal education grants indicate that state and local governments 
may not be in a state of budgetary equilibrium; they may reflect a process of frequent 
budgetary adjustment. Thus, it is unwarranted to claim that the result of a cross-sectional 
analysis on a given year is applicable to an extended period of time in assessing the impact of 
federal grants. 
In his cross-sectional analysis. Smith (1968) found that each additional dollar of 
federal education aid was associated with an increase of $1.69 in total educational 
expenditure. However, the estimate was not different statistically fi-om 1.0. In contrast, Pidot 
(1969) found that the effect of federal grants was substitutive-stimulative, but statistically not 
significantly different fi"om zero. His estimated coefficient was 0.13. 
The later studies by Booms and Hu (1971), and O'Brien (1971), however, provide 
some evidence that federal grants may be purely stimulative. In their study. Booms and Hu 
formulated a simultaneous equation model to distinguish demand aspects from supply aspects 
in an attempt to identify and thus measure the determinants affecting the demand for and 
supply of education. Using the TSLS procedure, they obtained a value of 1.68 for the 
marginal propensity to spend out of federal education grants. 
O'Brien investigated the simultaneous determination of grants and expenditures, the 
question of whether federal funds stimulate or substitute for state-local expenditures, and the 
effect of individual state characteristics on statistical estimates. Using a pooled data sample of 
48 states and different estimation techniques (OLS, TSLS, and GLS), he concluded that 
grants and expenditures were not determined simultaneously, that federal grants would 
stimulate state-local expenditures of their own funds on aided categories and cause 
expenditure reduction on unaided categories, and that the effect of individual state 
characteristics was important. One estimate suggested that each additional dollar of federal 
education aid will stimulate an additional 67 cents from the government receiving aid. 
Table 2-3 shows the studies for the post-1965 period. Most of these studies have been 
mentioned in the proceeding section under state grants and educational expenditure. Grubb 
and Michelson (1974) have found a significant and very stimulative effect of Title 1 federal 
grants on the education expenditures of 159 school districts in Massachusetts. They estimated 
that for each additional dollar of Title 1 aid received, a Massachusetts school district will, on 
average, raise its own educational expenditure by $4.4, that is, total educational expenditure 
will increase by $5.4 for each additional dollar of Title 1 aid. As for non-Title 1 aid, the effect 
Table 2-3. Empirical studies of the impact of federal grants on state and local educational expenditures, studies using data after 
1965 
Study Data (cross sectional 
unless stated otherwise) 
Dependent variable 
(educational expenditure, E) 
Independent variable 
(grant,G) 
Response 
(marginal change, dE/dG) 
Adams 
(1979) 
Addonizio 
(1991) 
Craig & 
Inman 
(1982) 
Feldstein 
(1978) 
school districts in 
Maryland, 1972-1976 
(pooled data) 
school districts in 
Wisconsin, 1973-1974 
and 1975-1976 (pooled 
data) 
345 school districts in 
Michigan, 1982-1983 
48 states, 1965-1977 
(pooled data) 
4690 school districts 
across country, 1970 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
state education aid to local 
educational authorities 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil federal education 
categorical grant 
per pupil federal education 
categorical grant 
1.05 to 1.18 
(elasticity = 0.118) 
0.65 for both periods 
(elasticity = 0.022) 
per pupil federal education block between 1.70 and 1.80 
grant 
federal pass-through education 
aid 
federal pass-by education aid 
federal matching education aid 
per pupil federal Title 1 grant 
for in-formula 
between 0.70 and 1.29 
for out-of-formula 
0.32 
-1.55 
-1.37 
0.72 
per pupil other federal education 0.41 
grant 
Table 2-3. (Continued) 
Study Data (cross sectional 
unless stated otherwise) 
Dependent variable 
(educational expenditure, E) 
Independent variable 
(grant,G) 
Response 
(marginal change, dE/dG) 
Grubb& 
Michelson 
(1974) 
Ladd 
(1975) 
Megdal 
(1984) 
Park & 
Carroll 
(1979) 
Vincent & 
Adams 
(1978) 
159 school districts in 
Massachusetts, 1968-
1969 
78 communities in 
Massachusetts, 1970 
177 school districts in 
New Jersey, 1970, 1974 
and 1977 
(pooled data) 
451 school districts in 
Michigan, 1971-1976 
school districts in 
Colorado, 1973 and 1975 
school districts in 
Minnesota, 1972 and 
1976 
per pupil locally fmanced 
expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure less 
tuition revenue 
per pupil total expenditure 
per pupil total expenditure 
change in per pupil total 
expenditure between 1975 and 
1973 
per pupil total expenditure 
change in per pupil total 
expenditure between 1976 and 
1972 
per pupil federal Title I grant 4.4 
per pupil other federal education -0.5 
grant 
per pupil state and federal 
education aid 
per pupil state and federal 
categorical education aid 
per pupil federal education 
catcgorical grant 
per pupil federal education aid 
change in per pupil federal 
education aid between 1975 and 
1973 
per pupil federal education aid 
change in per pupil federal 
education aid between 1976 and 
1972 
1.1 (elasticity = 0.11) 
1.45 for 1970 
1.13 to 2.46 for 1974 
1.75 for 1977 
0.38 (elasticity=0.02) 
1.6 for 1973 
0.87 for 1975 
1.46 
1.3 for 1972 
0.89 for 1976 
0.81 
is substitutive-stimulative. Total educational expenditure will increase by 50 cents for each 
additional dollar of non-Title 1 federal education aid. 
The result of Feldstein's (1978) study on Title 1 federal aid was in sharp contrast to 
that of Grubb and Michelson. Feldstein analyzed the total educational expenditures of 4,690 
school district across the country. Using 1970 data, he found that Title 1 federal aid had a 
significant but substitutive-stimulative effect on the total educational expenditure of a school 
district. For every additional dollar of Title 1 federal aid received, a school district will 
increase its total educational expenditure by 72 cents. As for non-Title 1 federal education aid, 
he found that a school district will raise its total educational expenditure by 41 cents for each 
additional dollar of such aid, a result comparable to that of Grubb and Michelson. A number 
of other studies also have considered the effect of federal categorical grants on total 
educational expenditure. Most of them yielded a value close to 1.0 for the marginal propensity 
to spend out of federal educational categorical grants. 
Ladd (1975) found that a Massachusetts school district will tend to increase total 
educational expenditure by $1.10 for each additional dollar of federal educational categorical 
grants.® Vincent and Adams (1978) have estimated for Colorado school districts that the 
marginal increase in total educational expenditure was 1.6 for the 1973 data, 0.87 for the 1975 
data, and 1.46 for the change analysis using changes in data between 1973 and 1975. They 
also found that the marginal increase in the total educational expenditure of Minnesota school 
districts was 1.3 in 1972, 0.89 in 1976, and 0.81 fi-om the change analysis between the two 
years. Adams (1979) found a value between 1.05 and 1.18 for Maryland school districts and 
0.65 for Wisconsin school districts. Park and Carroll's (1979) study of Michigan school 
districts showed 38 cents of marginal spending out of each dollar of federal aid, which was a 
substantially lower marginal increase in total educational expenditure. 
Craig and Inman (1982) studied the impacts of different types of federal grants on the 
amount of state education aid to local educational authorities (LEAs). They constructed 
models for the fiscal behavior of both state and local governments. The model for a state 
government consisted of state-aid equation, a tax equation, and a budget constraint. The 
model for a local government was comprised of equations for each of the major components 
of local expenditure, a tax equation, and a budget constraint. Using pooled data for 48 
contiguous states and the generalized least squares technique, they found different effects for 
diflFerent types of federal grants. The effects were statistically significant for pass-through 
federal education aid (PTEA, categorical education aid such as Title 1 that is given to the 
states with the requirement that such assistance be passed through to the LEAs for spending 
on schooling vnth no reduction in current state education aid), by-pass federal education aid 
(BPEA, categorical education aid given directly to LEAs, thereby "by-passing" the states), 
and federal matching education aid (MEA, categorical education aid requiring a limited match 
by state and local govenunents); but a fourth type of federal grant, an unconstrained general-
purpose aid given to state and/or LEAs (GRS), was found to be statistically insignificant. An 
additional dollar of PTEA was found to stimulate an additional 32 cents of state education aid 
to LEAs, but the estimates showed a state reduction in aid to LEAs of $1.55 and $1.37 for 
every additional dollar of BPEA and every additional dollar of MEA, respectively. Using their 
models and estimates, they found that each additional dollar of PTEA was associated with an 
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increase of 73 cents in local school expenditures, but each additional dollar of BPEA led to a 
reduction of 25 cents in local school expenditures. 
Megdal (1984) found that the elasticity relating total expenditure to total state and 
federal categorical grants was 0.05. This implied that districts increase spending by more than 
a dollar in response to receipts of a dollar of categorical aid, ranging $1.45 for 1970, $1.13 or 
$2.46 for 1974, depending on school districts, and $1.75 for 1977. Addonizio (1991) found 
that in the state of Michigan the school districts would increase total educational expenditure 
by $1.70 - $1.80 for school districts where the GTB formula was effective and by $0.70 -
$1.29 for school districts where the GTB formula was not effective, for each additional dollar 
of federal educational block grant. 
c. A synthesis 
The above review of the studies, which focused on the impacts of intergovernmental 
grants on educational expenditure, cover two levels of intergovernmental grants: federal 
grants to state and local governments, and state grants to local governments. Although there 
are differences among them with regard to the method of analysis used and the units of 
governments examined, the findings of these studies do lend themselves to some 
generalization about the responses of state and local governments to intergovernmental 
grants. In general, these studies have found significant effects of intergovernmental grants and 
a few socioeconomic and demographic factors such as property wealth, personal income, 
population density, age distribution, and the composition of local tax base on the level of 
educational expenditures of local governments. 
Most studies of unrestricted state block grants for education (or general state 
equalization aid in the form of foundation grants and/or flat grants) indicate that the effect of 
such grants on the total educational expenditure of a local government is substitutive-
stimulative. A local government receiving such a grant will typically use part of the grant for 
educational services; thus in this aspect, the impact of grant is stimulative. The local 
government, however, will use part of the grant on noneducational activities. It may use some 
of the state aid for other government functions or it may use it to reduce the local tax burden; 
in this respect, the state block grant is substitute for local expenditure. The marginal 
propensity to spend block grants for education reported in the empirical studies ranges from a 
low of 0.16 to a high of 1.06. However, most values do lie within the smaller range 0.3 to 0.7. 
An approximate estimate for the marginal increase in total educational expenditure per 
additional dollar of unrestricted state block grants for education is 50 cents. 
For the few states that have employed some form of matching grants for education, 
which lower the price of education services for a local government, empirical studies have 
found a negative relationship between total educational expenditure and the price education 
services. However, the estimated price elasticity implies that the response of a local 
government is either quite responsive or not responsive at all. The estimated price elasticity is 
-1.0 for Feldstein's (1975) study of Massachusetts, -0.65 to -0.49 for Ladd's (1975) study of 
Massachusetts, -0.02 for Park and Carroll's (1979) study of Michigan, and -0.09 to -0.08 for 
Adam's (1979) study of Colorado. Thus, the precise impact of a state matching grant for 
education seems to depend critically on the characteristics of a local government receiving the 
grant, and it is not recommended to generalize the experience of school districts in one state 
to school districts in another state. 
The state categorical grant for education is substitutive-stimulative for some school 
districts, but purely stimulative for other school districts. The estimated coeflRcients range 
from 0.17 to 1.8, but a number of later studies have indicated that for each additional dollar of 
state categorical grants for education, total educational expenditure will increase by an 
amount that is close to one dollar indicating that there is little stimulation of locally financed 
educational expenditure. On average, state categorical grants for education appear to be more 
stimulative than state unrestricted block grants for education. This may be due to the fact that 
a categorical grant usually has more strings and requirements attached to it than an 
unrestricted block grant, so that the government receiving the grant is induced to spend more 
on the categorical program per dollar of aid. 
Since federal involvement in education became more substantial only after 1965, a 
current focus relies more heavily on the studies that analyze the responses of state and local 
governments to federal aid after 1965. Among the studies discussed previously on federal 
categorical grants for education, the most extensive is that by Feldstein (1978). This research 
indicates that for each additional dollar of federal categorical grant for education, there is an 
increase of 72 cents in local educational expenditure; a similar estimate (73 cents) is provided 
by Craig and Inman (1982). Other studies (Ladd 1975, Vincent and Adams 1978, Adams 
1979), however, have found that the increase in local educational expenditure was as high as 
one dollar or even more. Based on these studies, one may conclude that an additional dollar of 
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a federal categorical grant for education is associated with an increase of 70 cents to one 
dollar of local educational expenditure. 
With regard to federal matching grants for education, there is not much work reported 
in the literature because the federal government has seldom used matching grants for 
education. A study by Craig and Inman (1982) has indicated that a state will reduce its aid to 
local governments that receive aid from the federal government. The impact of a federal 
matching grant thus may be less stimulating than a state matching grant. 
Although the link between intergovernmental grants and the level of educational 
expenditures has been established firmly, the exact magnitude of the relationship between 
them varies from study to study. This is hardly surprising when one recognizes the different 
samples, time periods, and analytical approaches that have been used. One can see from the 
previous discussion that the coefficient for intergovernmental grants can be different between 
cross-sectional studies and time series studies for the same entities. Also, the estimates appear 
to change according to the formulation of the statistical model. Moreover, for the same set of 
government units examined and the same model formulation used, a cross-sectional analysis 
often yields different values for the coefficient for intergovernmental grants when different 
time periods are considered. Furthermore, the impact of intergovernmental grants on 
educational expenditure is different for different groups of governmental units. These different 
results illustrate some of the conceptual and statistical problems in the empirical estimation of 
the effects of intergovernmental grants on educational expenditures, and one should be aware 
of them in interpreting the findings of these empirical studies. 
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Notes 
1. Earlier reviews of the impact of intergovernmental grants on educational expenditure include 
Cohn (1974), Vogel (1982), and Tsang and Levin (1982). 
2. Other subcategories usually include welfare, highway construction, and public safety. There are 
many studies in the empirical literature on the impact of intergovernmental grants on total public 
expenditure as well as on several categories of non-educational expenditures of state-local 
governments. They are not discussed here since they do not relate directly to educational 
expenditures. For a review of these studies, see Gramlich (1977). 
3. For a concise comparison of time series and cross-sectional studies, see Gramlich (1969). 
4. Most studies reviewed here have used total educational expenditure (per capita or per pupil) as the 
dependent variable. The studies by Smith (1968), Stem (1973), Cohn (1974), and Grubb and 
Michelson (1974) used locally-financed educational expenditure (per capita or per pupil) as the 
dependent variable. Total educational expenditure is equal to locally-financed educational 
expenditure plus intergovernmental aid. Bowman (1974) used school tax per pupil as the dependent 
variable while Craig and Inman (1982) is the only one reviewed here that used state education aid as 
the dependent variable. 
5. See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1978 pp. 316-321) for more details. 
6. Denzau (1975) tried to evaluate competing local education expenditure function specifications. He 
estimated several determinants specifications on a single data set and used t, F, and statistics of 
each to assess its relative performance. He found that the sign of parameters and their significance 
generally are robust with respect to specification. 
7. Since total educational expenditure is equal to locally financed educational expenditure plus 
intergovernmental aid, it can be shown readily that the coefficient for the intergovernmental aid 
variable of the regression using total educational expenditure as the dependent variable is equal to 
one plus the coefficient of the intergovernmental aid variable of the regression using locally financed 
educational expenditure as the dependent variable, ceteris paribus. 
8. The empirical studies related to general revenue sharing and federal unrestricted lump sum aid to 
state governments are Gramlich (1968), Inman (1971), Gramlich and Galpher (1973), Nathan et 
al. (1975), Juster (1976), and Nathan and Adams (1977). 
9. To be exact, the response is $1.10 for each additional dollar of total intergovernmental categorical 
aid (state plus federal categorical aid). 
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CHAPTER m. THE CHOICE PROBLEM 
A. The Median Voter Model 
Perhaps the most prominent specification of local fiscal choice is the median voter 
model. The basic specification of spatial (competition) politics finds its intellectual start in 
Hotelling (1929). Bowen (1943) developed and extended the fi-amework to problems of 
budgetary choice in a referendum setting, and Downs (1957) overlaid the needed institutional 
analysis under representative democracy, which enriched the model conceptually. Black 
(1958) explained Bowen's idea in great detail and developed the model for committee type 
majority rule decisions. Bradford and Oates (1971) applied it to policy, and Barr and Davis 
(1966), Borcherding and Deacon (1972), and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) used it as a 
formal basis for econometric analysis. In its simplest and empirically most usable form, the 
median voter model hypothesizes' (i) a given tax schedule and a single public service for 
which (ii) consumer-voters have single-peaked preferences. Voters are (iii) sincere voters -
i.e., vote their preferences, and not strategically, and can be ordered along a continuum fi'om 
low to high demanders of the public service. The result is a distribution of votes by these 
preferred levels of the public service. The assumed constitutional rule for local fiscal choice is 
(iv) to select the service level that will defeat all others in a majority rule election. Under 
assumptions (i)-(iv), the preferred level of local services will be the median of the distribution 
of the demanded quantities. To identify the crucial median service quantity and apply the 
model empirically, it is assumed (v) that the quantity is that demanded by the consumer-voter 
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with median income. Given assumptions (i)-(v), governments will select their budgetary levels 
'as if to maximize the well-being of each jurisdiction's median income family. The individual 
utility maximization model, then, is applied to the median income family to analyze 
governmental fiscal performances. Thus, this hypothesis give a rather powerful starting point 
for predictive and normative analysis of government behavior. 
While the median voter model has been well-accepted in public economics from the 
early 1970s, there have been serious challenges and criticism since then. The first one was 
Niskanen's (1971) portrayal of budget maximizing bureaucracy. He explicitly used the median 
voter model as the foundation of the demand side of his model. His innovation was building a 
supply side of the market and matching it to the median voter model of demand in order to 
develop a complete supply and demand model of public sector. His conclusions were at odds 
with the conclusion generally accepted as being implied in the median voter model that the 
public sector produced what the median voter wanted. 
The next one was to build Niskanen's budget maximization hypothesis directly into the 
voting models themselves. Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1982) extensively 
examined the agenda control model. The agenda control model uses a referendum process 
much like Bowen described, but illustrates that a budget maximizing agenda setter can 
manipulate the alternatives in such a manner as to produce an outcome larger than would be 
most preferred by the median voter. In their model, however, the referendum acts as a 
constraint on the agenda setter, and, since most public sector spending decisions are made 
without approval via referendum, it leaves open the more important question of what 
constrmns the size of the budget in the more typical case when a referendum is not held.^ 
The most devastating blow to the median voter model was dealt by McKelvey (1976). 
He used a model similar to Black's, where single-peaked preferences and sequential motions 
by majority rules are assumed, but he expanded the model so that political issues are 
multidimensional rather than single dimensional. He illustrated that an agenda setter could 
start at any point in the issue space and by strategically selecting issues end up at any other 
point in the issue space, so that there is no unique and stable majority rule outcome. But 
Tullock (1982) asked how the public sector could appear so stable in the face of the formal 
proof of instability. 
The median voter model, as a public sector demand, should not be expected to show a 
full public sector equilibrium. The median voter model is simply a model of demand 
aggregation, so that the model depicts the market demand when aggregated by the majority 
rule to be the demand of the median voter. The great advantage of the median voter paradigm 
is that it allows one to analyze social problems via the preferences of a single individual, the 
pivotal median voter. The arguments taken to discredit the median voter model as a general 
description of majority rule electoral outcomes do so only by showing that in theory there are 
many conditions that could cause the model's assumptions to be unrealistic. Most of the 
empirical evidence published regarding the median voter model is consistent with the model.^ 
Though the empirical evidence never provides irrefutable proof, since it can be consistent or 
inconsistent wdth a hypothesis, the evidence by itself would suggest that the model is more 
than just a special case that is rarely applicable to the real world. 
However, the theoretical and empirical evidence does not imply that the public sector 
produces what the median voter wants. This claim is stronger than the model warrants. 
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Rather, the evidence suggests that the median voter model is a good description of how 
demands are aggregated under majority rule in many circumstances. Pointing out that the 
model might not be valid under some circumstances in no way implies that the model is never 
valid. The median voter model provides a benchmark in that it describes a unique and stable 
majority rule equilibrium so that theorists can demonstrates how easy it is to develop plausible 
conditions under which the model's conclusion will not hold. Therefore, the median voter 
model is to provide a base for the development of a theory of political structure that is 
analogous to the theory of market structure in economics. 
The median voter hypothesis will be maintained throughout this study. In addition to 
the ample empirical evidences, the median voter model of expenditures of local governments 
(particularly in federal systems) might reasonably be expected to provide a fertile ground for 
empirical testing with the following reasons. First, expenditures are directly quantifiable so 
that 'objective' measurements of alternatives and policy outcomes are possible. Secondly, 
local populations tend to be more homogeneous than the population of the country as a 
whole. Thirdly, the largest local expenditure is for education. Since most school boards are 
independent taxation and expenditure authorities, they deal with expenditure in only one area. 
This leads to an important element of the unidimensionality.'' 
B. Empirical Specification Problems 
Empirical studies of the demand for public education and the impact of 
intergovernmental grants have encountered some specification problems due to the peculiar 
53 
nature of the good. One problem is to define the good in a measurable way since it is not 
observable directly like most private goods. The early local expenditure determinants studies 
simply concentrated on total expenditures. Since none of them were based on any solid 
theoretical foundation, the issue of output definition and measurement was not important. As 
studies turned to voting models and other community decision frameworks to generate public 
demand functions, this problem has been confronted. The most common approach has been to 
define local education services as a single good, measuring it by expenditures or other criteria 
such as standardized test scores. Measuring education by expenditures has the obvious 
drawback in that it does not take into account resource cost differences across jurisdictions. 
Deflating expenditures by an input price index, if any, may not solve the problems. As Leekely 
(1980) regards local public education as a category of multiple outputs such as the mastery of 
cognitive, social, vocational skills, and positive attitudes, the serious question about education 
as a single good might be raised. He recognizes that this package need not be identical across 
communities. Then, the multiple output approach was suggested. However, his approach 
brings us no closer to resolving measurement problems. This study just follows convention 
and pursues the single-output approach for measuring the impact of aid to education 
expenditure. 
Though the measurable definition is determined, a measure of individual consumption 
must be devised to make the representative voter demand framework operational since 
education exhibits a certain degree of publicness in consumption. Both Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) show a rather simple way of capturing 
this congestion phenomenon.^ Borcherding and Deacon demonstrate that the same principles 
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applied in private goods demand studies could be used in public goods demand studies since 
the relationship between individual consumption and community consumption is specified. 
Another problem in educational aid studies is that several aid programs exist 
simultaneously. The complexity of some aid programs must be simplified in order to keep the 
analysis tractable. 
These specification problems are compounded by the fact that institutional structures 
of local public good markets differ even within the same geographical area. Part of this 
problem can be alleviated by studying only the local governments within a given state. But the 
problem is not corrected that easily. Within the same state, the social decision mechanism 
among cities, suburban, and rural areas will differ by different socio-economic characteristics. 
Time series data and/or pooled cross-section data with some degree of arbitrariness should be 
considered. 
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Notes 
1. Most of the following paragraph is quoted from Inman (1978). 
2. See Holcombe (1983), chapters 3 and 4. 
3. Examples include Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), 
Ladd (1975), McEachem (1978), Inman (1978), Lovell (1978), Black, Lewis and Link (1979), 
Holcombe (1980), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982), Munley (1984), Megdal (1984), Mathis 
and Zech (1986), Deno and Mehay (1987), and Tumbull (1987). 
4. Romer and Rosenthal (1979), p. 146. 
5. See the following Chapter IV for a detailed form and implications. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE MODEL 
A. The Model of Local Education Expenditure Determination 
In this section, a simple model that can be used to analyze the behavior of a single-
output (i.e., education) government or school district board will be presented. Following the 
theoretical derivation, the empirical specifications are developed. All of the analysis in this 
study is conducted under the median voter hypothesis. All of the specifications derived in this 
chapter could be considered extensions of the Borcherding and Deacon (1972) model, since 
the study follows their method of incorporating both the publicness characteristic of public 
goods and the production technology into the analysis. 
Under the median voter hypothesis, the community behavior (or governing authority 
behavior) can be modeled 'as if it reflects the median voter's decision process. This 
representative voter maximizes his utility over the opportunity set defined by individual and 
community financial and technological constraints. Before the model is developed, the 
relevant variables for the analysis are defined as follows: 
X = the private goods consumed, the price being equal to one for normalization 
q„ = the amount of locally supplied good captured by the median voter, that is the 
education to a white pupil 
qb = the amount of locally supplied good captured by the median voter, that is the 
education to a black pupil 
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Qw = the amount of locally supplied good (education) actually produced for white 
pupils 
Qb = the amount of locally supplied good (education) actually produced for black 
pupils 
z = the socio-economic characteristics of the community 
Y = the median voter's income 
T = the median voter's tax bill 
Cw = the cost of producing Q„ 
Cb = the cost of producing Qb 
C = the total cost to provide education to the community (= C„ + Cb) 
G = the unconditional block aid (grant) 
m = the matching aid rate 
i„ = input price vectors to produce Q„, Ww and r„ 
ib = input price vectors to produce Qb, Wb and rb 
Nw = the service consumption population, the number of white pupils in the district 
Nb = the service consumption population, the number of black pupils in the district 
V = the total property tax base 
Vm = the median voter's tax base (= the value of median housing) 
t = the property tax rate 
t • V = the total property tax revenue 
Ew = the expenditure for white pupil 
Eb = the expenditure for black pupil 
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Under the standard consumer choice paradigm, the voter chooses private goods x, and 
publicly supplied goods q„ and qb with the socio-economic characteristics z to maximize the 
utility function over the opportunity sets. The utility fonction and the opportunity sets are 
defined as follows; 
(4.1) U = U(x, q„, qb; z) 
(4.2) Y = x + T 
(4.3) T = T(C,G,m) 
(4.4) C = C„ + Cb 
(4.5) Cw = = C(Qw, iw) 
(4.6) Cb = = C((3b, ib) 
(4.7) qttr = = h(Q«,N«) 
(4.8) qb = = h(Qb,Nb) 
The utility function, equation (4.1) is assumed to be regular strictly quasi-concave, and the 
median voter chooses the education level for both black and white pupils in the district. 
Equation (4.2) is the voter's budget constraint and it states that income divided between the 
voter's tax bill and all other expenditures. Function (4.3) shows the relationship between the 
voter's tax bill, the production cost, and the education aid (grant) to local jurisdiction (school 
district) from higher levels of government. This relationship is determined by institutional 
constraints and higher government grant policy. Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are the cost 
functions, which show the relationship between the production levels, input prices, and total 
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production costs. The production technology for Q and local authority's input choice are 
embodied in these functions. Equations (4.7) and (4.8) are the congestion functions. They 
show that the relationship between the output produced, the number of persons served, and 
the amount of good captured by the voter.' 
Equations (4.7) and (4.8) can be solved for Q such that 
(4.9) Qw = h-*(q«,N,v) 
(4.10) Qb = h-'(qb,Nb) 
and substitute (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.9) and (4.10) into (4.2) gives the budget constraint 
as 
(4.11) Y = X + T(q„, qb, N„,Nb, G, iw, ib, m) 
The community or school board, then, behaves as if the median voter maximizes U( •) 
subject to (4.11). The interior solution yields the reduced form demand equations for the 
public output measured as q„ and qb, 
(4.12) q* qw(Nw^Nb, G, iw, ib, m, Y , z) 
(4.13) qb = qb(Nw,Nb, G, iw, ib, m, Y ; z) 
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Since q is unobservable, (4.12) and (4.13) are transformed into the reduced form expenditure 
functions. Using (4.5) and (4.9), and (4.6) and (4.10), respectively, 
(4.14) Ew = C[h-W,Nw),iw] 
Ew(Nw, Nb, G, iw, ibi Y, z) 
(4.15) Eb = C[h-^(qb,Nb),ib] 
Eb(Nw,Nb, G, iw, ib, ni, Y, z) 
The reduced forms (4.14) and (4.15) can be used to estimate the district response to grants-in-
aid programs, income, and others. 
Now the reduced form functions for q and, hence for E, are derived here. Assume the 
production process for Q exhibits constant returns. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
is supported by evidence summarized by Hirsch (1970) and also found in Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972). Hirsch cites empirical studies which indicate that average costs are constant 
over wide ranges of output for a large number of public services supplied by small, localized 
production units (e.g., police protection, local education, hospitals, sanitation, etc.). These 
findings together with cost minimization and elastic factor supply within each unit imply 
productions exhibiting constant returns to scale. Then the total production cost becomes 
proportional to Q, 
(4.16) Cv, = Uw(iw) Qw 
(4.17) Cb = Ub(ib) • Qb 
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where u,^iw) and Ub(ib) are unit cost functions, respectively. The local share of a dollar of 
additional expenditures is 
(4.18) LS = 1 - marginal matching rate 
= 1 - m 
If LS < 1, then matching grant program is in effect, and ifLS = 1, then either the matching 
program is not in effect or there is no matching grant in the district. Since G is total 
unconditional aid to the community, the total cost to the community or school district of 
supplying Q„ and Qb is 
(4.19) LS •[u„(iw) • Qw + Ub(ib) • Qb] - G 
Assume the property taxation is the sole source of locally raised tax revenue given that 
the property taxes have been the primary source of local government tax revenue. Then total 
property tax revenue equals total cost to provide Q„ and Qb as^ 
(4.20) t • V = LS • [ u„(i„) • Q„ + Ub(ib) • Qb] - G 
The local property tax rate becomes 
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f4 21) t = ^^'t"wOw)'Qw '^"bOb)'Qb]~^ 
V 
If the median voter's tax base is Vm, then his local tax bill is 
(4.22) t • V„ = ^ • {LS • [ uw(i«) • Qw + Ub(ib) • Qb] - G) 
where (YJ V) is the median voter's tax share (TS). 
Following Borcherding and Deacon, congestion phenomena associated with Q can be 
expressed as 
(4.23)qw = Qw-
(4.24)qb = Qb-Nb'''' 
where Ttw and TCb are the congestion index (jt > 0). If n = 0, q is a pure public good; if ti = 1, it 
is a pure private good; if ti > 1, it is a congested good; and if 1 > tc > 0, then it is a quasi-
public good. Rearranging (4.23) and (4.24), 
(4.25) Q„ = qw-N;^«' 
(4.26) Qb = qb-Nj'' 
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Substitute (4.22), (4.25), and (4.26) into (4.11), 
(4.27) Y + TS -G = X + TS -LS -Miw) -qw • + Ub(ib) -qb • nJ" ] 
= X + (TPw •qw+ TPb qb) 
where TPw = TS -LS • u»v(iw) • is the median voter's tax price to provide white 
education q^, and TPb = TS -LS • Ub(ib) • is the median voter's tax price to provide black 
education qb. 
Then, the Lagrangian is 
L(x, q„, qb, X) = U(x, q„, qb; z) + X[ Y + TS -G - x - (TP„ •qw+ TPb - qb)] 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality are 
(4.28) 
L x  = U x - ^  =  0  
Lq„ = Uq^ - -TS -LS • u„(i„) • = Uq^, - A. • TPw = 0 
Lqb = Uq^ - X -TS -LS • Ub(ib) •nJ'' = Uq^ - X • TPb = 0 
L;, = Y + TS - G - X - TS -LS -Miw) -qw + Ub(ib) -qb -NJ" ] 
= Y + TS -G - X - (TPw •qw+ TPb -qb) = 0 
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Solve for q„ and qb, 
(4.29) qw = q«(TP„, m, Y + TS • G; z) 
(4.30) qb = qb(TPw, m, Y + TS G; z) 
and the reduced form expenditure functions are 
(4.31) = UwOw) • •q„(TP„, TPb, Y + TS -G ; z) 
(4.32) Eb = Ub(ib) • nJ'' • qb(TP«, TPb, Y + TS G ; z) 
In order to make (4.31) and (4.32) estimable, the specific unit costs and the demand 
functional form are needed. Assume Cobb-Douglas production technology with labor(L) and 
capital(K) inputs, 
Qb^Ab-V •Kb^'-''^ 
With the input prices Ww, r„, Wb and rb, the cost functions can be derived such that minimize 
(w„ -Lw + r„ -Kw) subject to Q„ = Aw -Kj' and Qw = q„ • for white education and 
minimize (wb -U + rb -Kb) subject to Qb = Ab -Lb" -Kb"" and Qb = qb • N^'' for black 
education. 
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Take the Lagrangian, 
L(U-, K„, X«) = w« -U- + r« -Kw + X«(qw -N"/ - A„ -L-/ -KJ' "®*) 
For interior solutions, 
Llw = w„ - X„ -5 -Aw •(L,v/Kw)^®'" = 0 
Lkw = r„ - Xtv '(1-5) 'Aw -(Lw/Kw)® = 0 
Uw = qw • - Aw -U® -Kw" 0 
Solve for L* and K„, 
U = [(wjr„) •( qw -N^^w/ A„) 
K„ = [(wj r.) -(l-SyS]® •( q„-K^/A^) 
Substitute L«, and K„ into cost identity, 
Ww -Lw + r„ -Kw = (1/Aw)-(wjdf •( r,./(l-5)f-'> • • q„ 
Divide by q„ to obtain the unit cost fiinction, 
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(4.33) u«(i«) • =(1/Aw)-iwJdf •( r„/(l-5))<'-®> 
Similarly, 
(4.34) Ub(ib) • NJ" =(1/Ab) -(Wb/p)" •( rb/(l-p))<'-'" -N;" 
It is also assumed that the demand is a constant elasticity multiplicative function of 
prices and income. Then (4.29) and (4.30) imply the specific demand functions. 
(4.35) q„ = f(z) -aw • • TPfe ^ -(Y + TS •G)°'3 
(4.36) qb = g(z) -at • TpP' • TPb^^ .(y + TS 
where TS = the median voter's tax share, ai = the own-price elasticity for white education, 
a2 = the cross-price elasticity between white and black education, = aggregate income 
elasticity for white education, Pi = the cross-price elasticity between black and white 
education, P2 = the own-price elasticity for black education, P3 = aggregate income elasticity 
for black education, and f(z) = Z (yj • zj j and g(z) = E (tij • zj j are functions of district 
j=l j=l 
socioeconomic characteristics. Community-wide differences such as population ratio between 
black and whites, private school enrollment, percent owner occupied housing and others may 
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be systematically related to income, grant, and prices. Those effects, if any, would be captured 
through the functions f(z) and g(z), 
Taking the natural logarithm of (4.35) and (4.36) equations yield the familiar log-linear 
or constant elasticity logarithm (CEL) functional forms. The CEL is a very popular form in the 
empirical literature. It has convenient properties: its parameters are easily interpreted as 
elasticities and readily estimable for appropriate error structures. Using (4.31), (4.33), (4.34) 
and (4.35), 
(4.37) Ew = f(z) -aw -(l/Aw)^^^!^ •(l/Ab)'*^ .(ls .tS)("''^2) .[(w„/5)® •( r„/(l-5)y' 
• [(Wb/p)''-(rb/(l-p)y'"T^ •(Y + TS-G)"3 
Likewise, using (4.32), (4.33), (4.34) and (4.36), 
(4.38) Eb = g(z) -at -(l/Aw)"^! •(1/Ab)^^+P2) .(ls .tS)^P'+P2) .[(wJ6)' •( r„/(l-6)y' 
•[(Wb/p)" •( rb/ ( l - p ) y ' . ( Y  +  T S  
Dividing (4.37) and (4.38) by N„ and Nb on both sides, respectively, and taking the natural 
logarithm, the reduced form estimating equations will be derived. 
(4.39) In ew = In a„' + (a, + a2) In (LS -TS) + (1 + a,) In [(w„/5)^ •( rw/(l-6)y' 
+ a2ln[(wb/p)''-(rb/(l-p)y'''"] +[(1 +ai) -Ttw-1] lnN„ + a2 -TtblnNb 
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+ as In (Y + TS -G) + In f(z) + Sw 
(4.40) In Cb = In ab' + (p, + P2) In (LS -TS) + p, In [(wJ6/ •( r«/(l-6)y' 
+ (1 + P2) In [(Wb/p)" •( rb/(l-p)y'-P'] + p, Kw In Nw + [(1 + P2) -Kb - 1] In Nb 
+ Ps In (Y + TS -G) + In g(z) + et 
where ew= EJN„, eb= Eb/Nb, a„'= -(l/Ab)"^, ab'= at •(1/A„)P« •(l/Ab)^^"'^^), 
and Sw and Sb are error terms. These equations are linear in regressors. Hence, they can be 
estimated using OLS technique. OLS estimators yields unbiased reduced form parameter 
estimates which are also efficient if the errors are independently distributed with zero mean 
and constant variance 
The above equations show that per pupil expenditure is a function of median voter's 
tax share, wage rate for both black and white education inputs, number of both black and 
white pupils, and aggregated income that is the median income plus the median voter's 
perceived share of total grants. The presence of intergovernmental grants in aggregated 
income term is of particular interest. This theoretically derived model shows the grant could 
affect median voter's behavior for provision of local public good. The inclusion of inter-racial 
factors could be justified since the median voter (or voters) decides the expenditure level of 
education for both black and white schools simultaneously through his decision-making 
process, that is voting. The model is, therefore, consistent with the economic theory of 
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majority rule. Finally, the model allows the estimation of the price elasticities, aggregated 
income elasticities, and the degree of publicness of the education service. 
B. The Specification of the Expenditure Equation 
Here the actual specifications that will be estimated are constructed. First of all, all the 
specification hypotheses are derived under the assumption of a constant user cost of capital. 
Production functions across school district units are assumed to be identical and taken to be of 
the Cobb-Douglas constant returns technology. Labor and capital are the only factors of 
production and available in perfectly elastic supply. However, capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile between communities, whereas labor is not. This implies that the rental rate, 
r, is identical across the communities, but wage rate can differ. The omission of r would bias 
the results to the extent that r varies over time, but the direction of any bias is not clear 
immediately. It is, therefore, hoped that any time variation in r is negligible for the sample 
periods, and thus will not have any adverse impact on estimates. Equations (4.33) and (4.34) 
can be rewritten as 
(4.41) u^iw) • = a' -w^® 
(4.42) Ub(ib)- NJ" =a"-Wb''-NS'' 
where a' = (1/A„) -(1/5)® •(r^(l-5)y'-®> and a" = (l/At) -(l/p)" -Ml-p))" ""l With m = 0 
since there was no matching aid over the time period covered in this study, and with (4.41) 
and (4.42), the equation (4.39) and (4.40) become the estimating equations such that 
(4.43) In Cw = In a + (ai + ai) In TS + (1 + ai) In w„® + 0.2 In Wb'' + [(1 + ai) -Ttw - 1] In N„ 
+ a2 -Tib InNb + as In (Y + TS -G) + In f(z) + 8w 
(4.44) In eb = In b + (Pi + P2) In TS + pi in w„®+ (1 + P2) In Wb'' + Pi -tIw In N„ 
+ [(1 + P2) -Tib -1] In Nb+ p3 In (Y + TS -G) + In g(z) + 8b 
wherea = a„-(l/Aw)('-^i> -[(1/6)® •(r„/(l-5)y'-[(l/p)" •(rb/(l 
and b = ab-(l/A«)Pi •(l/Ab)^^''P2>-[(1/5)® •(r«/(l-5))"-®']Pi [(l/p)" •(rb/(l-p))"-'"]^''*-P2\ 
The above equations show that the appropriate income measure in the demand 
function is the aggregate income term (Y + TS G). Only Perkins (1977) and Tumbull (1987) 
use the aggregate income term, and most other studies (Feldstein (1975), Ladd (1975), Black, 
Lewis, and Link (1979), Megdal (1983), and many more) use separate income and grant 
terms. But none of them present any theoretical justification for the disaggregate income and 
grant terms. However, Tumbull (1987) compares the various demand specifications to his 
theoretically-derived model, which contains aggregate income. Using the Cox specification 
test, however, the resuh supports the popular notion that allowing for separate voter income 
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and grant is superior to treating grant as a supplement to income, though theoretically not 
preferred. Respecifying demand functions (4.35) and (4.36) as 
(4.45) q„ = f{z)-a.-TP^» -TPb' •g«4 
(4.46) qb = g(z)-ab-TpPi TPb^^ -¥^3 
where g = G/(N„ + Nb), i.e., per pupil unconditional block grants. Then, the reduced form 
estimating equations become 
(4.47) In Cw = in a + (ai + ai) In TS + (1 + aO In + a.2 In Wb'' + [(1 + aO • Ji„ - 1] In Nw 
+ a2 -Tib In Nb + as In Y + ou In g + In f(z) + 8w 
(4.48) In eb = In b + (Pi + pa) In TS + Pi In w„®+ (1 + P2) In Wb" + Pi -tCw In N„ 
+ [(1 + P2) -Ttb -1] In Nb+ P3 in Y + P4 In g + In g(z) + Sb 
where as = the income elasticity for white education, cu = the grant elasticity for white 
education, P3 = the income elasticity for black education, P4 = the grant elasticity for black 
education, and the rest of coefficients are the same as before. 
In addition to the ad hoc adjustment of grant, the grant term, g (the unconditional total 
federal and state block aid per pupil) can be separated by federal and state, or by federal, state 
categorical and state block (equalization fund) grant. Most studies deal with the impact of the 
grant separately as seen in the literature review in chapter II. Thus, the following estimating 
equations are derived to see the grant impact separately. 
(4.49) In Cw = In a + (tti + ai) In TS + (1 + ai) In w„® + 0.2 In Wb" + [(1 + aO Kw -1] In Nw 
+ a2 -Tib InNb + as In Y + 04 In gf + as In g, + In f(z) + e„ 
(4.50) In eb = In b + (Pi + P2) In TS + Pi In Ww®+ (1 + P2) In Wb*" + Pi -tIw In N„ 
+ [(1 + P2) -Ttb - 1] In Nb+ Ps In Y + P4 In gf + Ps In g, + In g(z) + Sb 
(4.51) In Cw = In a + (tti + ai) In TS + (1 + ai) In w„® + a2 In Wb" + [(1 + ai) -tIw -1] In N„ 
+ a2 -Tib In Nb + as In Y + cu In gf + as In gc + Ofi In ge + In f(z) + 
(4.52) In Cb = In b + (Pi + P2) In TS + Pi In Ww^+ (1 + P2) In Wb'' + Pi -tIw In Nw 
+ [(1 + P2) •TCb - 1] In Nb+ Ps In Y + P4 In gf + Ps In gc + Pe In ge + In g(z) + 8b 
where gf = per pupil total federal education aid, gs = per pupil total state education aid (= gc + 
ge), gc = per pupil state categorical education aid, and ge = per pupil state equalization fiind. 
The expenditure estimation equations, so far, have been based on the assumption of 
complete exporting or no nonresidential property tax shifting onto residential property 
owners. However, partial shifting or incomplete exporting occurs if some of the nonresidential 
tax burden is shifted onto residential property owners. If nonresidential property taxes are 
73 
shifted, the community tax base composition may alter the tax price perceived by residential 
voters. This is based on the premise that voters perceive that firms are mobile in response to 
inter-community fiscal differentials. Thus, voters recognize that greater education expenditure 
(hence higher tax rate) may prompt firms to move their assets to another jurisdiction. An 
increase in q reduces the nonresidential tax base, hence it increases the residential voter's 
share of the community tax burden. 
Ladd (1975) examines the possibility that the proportion of the nonresidential property 
tax perceived as borne by local residents could be somewhere between zero and unity. As 
Gh-eene and Munley (1984) pointed out, although nonresidential tax bills may be paid for 
almost entirely by nonresidential property owners, adjustment in a multijurisdictional setting 
could lead to a far different incidence of their real burdens. These increased tax burdens could 
lead to decreased returns for factors of production owned by residents or increased prices for 
residential consumers. This might be perceived by local taxpayer-voters and could explain 
Ladd's finding that less than 100% of these nonresidential taxes are perceived to be exported. 
If the residential property owners in a community perceive themselves as bearing part 
of the property tax on nonresidential property,^ the tax share defined above needs to be 
modified: If a resident perceives some forward shifting of nonresidential property taxes, the 
higher the nonresidential portions of tax base, the lower the spending on education, other 
things being equal. In this case, the homeowner bears not only the taxes on his home 
(residential property), but also some of the nonresidential property tax burden. The tax share 
as defined previously would understate the price perceived by the homeowner. By multiplying 
the tax share by [1 + 0 -(Vn/V)], where VJV is the nonresidential fraction of the tax base and 
0 is a parameter to be estimated, this effect can be incorporated into the model/ 
Under this specification, the larger the value of 0, the greater the degree of perceived 
shifting. The estimated value of 0 can be negative with the type of fiscal illusion suggested by 
Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal (1982). A priori reasoning suggests that local residents can 
export to nonresidential owners more than 100% of taxes levied on such property. Filimon, 
Romer, and Rosenthal have examined the possibility that it could be in the interests of an 
individual attempting to maximize the size of the local budget to create fiscal illusion that 
might either artificially deflate the voter's perceived level of intergovernmental aid or 
artificially deflate their perception of taxes paid by others. In this case, even if voters 
recognize that some shifting of tax burdens fi"om nonresidential property to themselves might 
occur, conceivably they still could perceive exportation of more than 100% of such property 
taxes. 
In order to estimate this effect, [1+0 -(Vn/V)] will be added to equations (4.43), 
(4.44), (4.47), (4.48), (4.49), (4.50), (4.51) and (4.52). 
(4.53) in e«, = In a + (ai + aa) In {TS [1+0 -(VnT/V)]} + (1 + ai) In w„^ + a2 In Wb'' 
+ [(1 + ai) -TCw -1] InNw + a2 -Tib In Nb + as In {Y + TS [1 + 0 - (Vn/V)] -G} 
+ In f(z) + 8„ 
(4.54) In Cb = In b + (p, + pz) In {TS [1+0 (VJV)]} + p, In wj+ (1 + P2) In Wb" 
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+ 3i -Tiw In N« + [(1 + 32) -Tib - 1] In Nb+ P3 In {Y + TS •[! + 0 •(¥„/¥)] -G} 
+ In g(z) + 8b 
(4.55) In Bw = In a + (ai + az) In {TS • [1 + 0 -(Vn/V)]} + (1 + aO In v/J + az In Wb'' 
+ [(1 + tti) -TTw - 1] In Nw + CL2 -Tib In Nb + as In Y + (Xj In g + In f(z) + 
(4.56) In Cb = In b + (pi + P2) In {TS -[1+0 -(Vn/V)]} + pi In w„'+ (1 + P2) In Wb" 
+ Pi -Tiw In N„ + [(1 + P2) -Ttb - 1] In Nb+ P3 In Y + P4 In g + In g(z) + Sb 
(4.57) In Bw = In a + (ai + az) In {TS • [1 + 0 -(Vn/V)]} + (1 + aO In w„® + ai In Wb'' 
+ [(1 +ai) -Tiw -1] lnNw + a2 - Jib InNb + as In Y + ou In gf+ a5 In gs 
+ In f(z) + Ew 
(4.58) In Bb = Inb + (p, + pz) In {TS -[1+0 -(Vn/V)]) + pi In wj+ (1 + p^) In Wb" 
+ Pi -Kw In N„ + [(1 + P2) -Ttb -1] In Nb+ P3 In Y + P4 In gf + P; In 
+ In g(z) + Sb 
(4.59) In ew = In a + (ai + az) In {TS -[1+0 -(VnyV)]} + (1 + a,) In wj + az In Wb" 
+ [(1 + tti) -Ttw -1] In N„ + az -Jib In Nb + as In Y + a4 In gf + as In gc 
+ ae In ge + In f(z) + 8w 
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(4.60) In Cb = Inb + (Pi + P2) In {TS -[1+0 -(Vn/V)]} + p. In wj+ (1 + pj) In Wb" 
+ Pi •7c„lnN„ + [(1 + P2) -Ttb-1] lnNb+ P3 In Y + P4 lngf+ Ps Inge 
+ Pe In ge + In g(z) + 8b 
The above specifications require nonlinear estimation algorithm since they exhibit the 
nonlinearity in parameters. They will be estimated using nonlinear least squares (NLS), which 
should yield consistent parameter estimates. 
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Notes 
1. With the congestion function, hq > 0 and hN ^ 0 are assumed since the increase in production will 
increase the amount of consumption, and increase in consuming population will either decrease the 
amount of consumption or leave it unchanged. If hq = 1, there is no consumption congestion, and if 
hq < 1, there is. If hw = 0, there is no consumption congestion, and if hw < 0, Q is a congested good. 
2. The expression (4.20) is the community or school district budget constraint to provide public service 
q (education), since it can be written as t V + G = LS •[ Uw(iw) • Qw + Ub(ib) • Qb], which shows that 
total revenue equals total cost for provision of q. 
3. Previous studies showed that the nonresidential property tax base is divided into the combination of 
conunercial, industrial, agricultural, rural, and vacant property. See L^add (1975), Silluigs and 
Folsom (1980), and Megdal (1984). However, because of data availability over the time periods 
covered in this study, the total tax base is divided into two categories such as residential and 
nonresidential property. 
4. This ad hoc way of treating the effects of nonresidential property is similar to those derived 
theoretically by Ladd (1975) and others, as in endnote 3. 
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CHAPTER V. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Data 
The sample data set consists of a pooled cross-sectional time series of 23 Maryland 
counties for a 27-year time period, 1929 through 1955. Schools were segregated by race 
throughout this period. There were 23 white school systems and 22 black school systems. 
There were no black schools in Garret County. The advantage of using Maryland is that 
school district and county boundaries are coterminous. This study covers the grade schools, 
grade 1 through 8. Since all but one county provided both black and white schools, the data 
are well-suited to the models described in the previous chapter. Some counties did not have 
their ovm high schools for black children during this period; thus, high school enrollment and 
expenditure decisions might involve more than one county, and it is inappropriate for the 
analysis of this study. 
The data set was compiled mainly from the Annual Reports of the State of Maryland 
Board of Education. This data set is drawn from the same source as Orazem (1987) and 
TenHoeve (1992). The variable definitions are listed in Table 5-1. The data set in the Reports 
includes total current expenditure, number of pupils belonging or attending, teachers salaries, 
number of teachers, number of children enrolled in private schools, number of private schools, 
and much more. Those are reported separately for black and white schools and aggregated by 
the county level. Note that per pupil expenditure is calculated by dividing total current 
expenditure by average number of pupils belonging (enrolled).' Some other data sets that 
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Table 5-1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
(i = w for white 
b for black) 
Ei total current expenditures in real terms by county 
Ci per pupil expenditures in real terms by county (=Ei/Ni) 
Ni average number of pupils belonging (enrolled) in grade school by county 
Y per capita average personal income in real terms by county as a proxy for median 
income 
Wi average salaries of teachers in real terms by county as a proxy for wage rate 
5, p labor share for white and black, respectively, across counties 
TS median voter's tax share (= Vn/V) 
V total county basis taxable at full rate in real terms, i.e., property tax base 
Vm value of median housing in real terms by county 
Vm value of county nonresidential property in real terms 
Vr value of county residential property in real terms 
G total state and federal unconditional education block aid to county in real terms 
g per pupil total state and federal unconditional education block aid to county in real 
terms 
gf per pupil total federal education aid to county in real terms 
gs per pupil total state education aid to county in real terms 
go per pupil total state categorical education aid to county in real terms 
ge per pupil total state equalization fiand to county in real terms 
L index number of average value per acre of farm real estate in Maryland 
(1912-14= 100) 
are reported by county are observations on federal aid, state aid, equalization fund, and county 
school tax, but their usage is not reported separately between black and white schools. 
Nonetheless, the aid data, as well as expenditure and other series, are uniformly defined, and 
the reports are regarded as accurate since each district is required to file the necessary 
statistics. This can be another advantage to using the data set of Maryland school districts. 
The population figures used here are taken fi-om an unpublished vital statistics table provided 
by officials of the State of Maryland Board of Education.^ 
The per capita average personal income is used as a surrogate for the median voter's 
income since median income by state or by county level is not available for the time period 
covered in this study. This is justified under the assumption that the two quantities are highly 
correlated.' Annual total personal income for the state of Maryland is taken from the State 
Personal Income: 1929-1987, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
However, as there is no personal income data by county level, this must be estimated. The 
county-level total employment and sectoral employment level by industry for the years 1940, 
1950, and 1960 are taken from Regional Employment by Industry, 1940-1970. For 1930, they 
are taken fi"om the 15 th Census of the United States: 1930, Bureau of the Census, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. With the county-level occupational distribution, or the 
employment level by industry for 1930,1940,1950, and 1960, each county's employment 
level by industry is interpolated for the years between 1930 and 1940,1940 and 1950, and 
1950 and 1960. Then, each county's proportion of employment level to total state 
employment level in each industry is calculated for those years. Now, fi-om the State Personal 
Income: 1929-1987 the earnings by industry for the state for each year of 1929 through 1955 
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are taken, and they are multiplied by each county's proportions of employment level 
calculated above. This procedure generates each county's earnings by each industry. When 
each industry's earnings (personal income) for any one county for any given year are added, it 
becomes the total personal income for the county for any given year. Then, the county's total 
personal income is divided by population to generate per capita personal income for that year. 
This income data series shows a pattern similar to the state income data series over the years, 
and it is used as a surrogate of median income. 
The expenditure share attributed to labor, that is, the labor share for whites and blacks, 
6 and p, should be estimated, too. It should be constant across the counties as a necessary 
condition for the constant-retums-to-scale Cobb-Douglas specification. Following 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Perkins (1977), the labor share is estimated by averaging 
the ratio of expenditures for salaries to total expenditures across all school districts for a given 
year. The derivation of labor share is as follows: 
The production function, Q„ = A„ and the total cost constraint, TC«, = 
w„ -L,, + fw -Kw, imply that 
MPk„ = (1-6)-A„-U® -KV,-® 
If the first order conditions of constrained output maximization are satisfied, then 
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w„/r«, = MPlw/ MPk„ = [5/(l-5)]/(K«,/Lw) 
Then the following is derived. 
5 Wv» •Lw/(Ww 'Lw Tw 'Kw) 
The constant term 5 is the labor share of the total cost of education for white schools where 
Ww -Lwr is the labor cost and (ww -Lw + Tw -Kw) is the total cost. This labor share is calculated 
separately for each year throughout the time period. Similarly, p is calculated as 
p = Wb - WCwb -Lb + Tb -Kb) 
Before going into the estimation of expenditure equations, one should note that the 
median housing value (Vm) is included in the reduced form estimating equation as a numerator 
of the tax share variable. However, the median housing values are available only for 1930, 
1940 and 1950 from the Census of the United States. Thus each year's median housing values 
have to be estimated for the pooled data set. 
Using the ordinary least squares technique, an estimate of median housing value is 
derived by regressing median housing value on the index number of average value per acre of 
farm real estate for Maryland, L, residential property value, V,, the square of residential 
property value, W?, and the dummy variables for each county, CO;, with no intercept for the 
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data set of 1930, 1940, and 1950. The index number of average value per acre of farm real 
estate is used as a proxy for the land value, and it is taken from various issues of Farm Real 
Estate Market Developments, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Since the state of Maryland had been regarded as mostly an agricultural state, the farm real 
estate value could reflect the land value in general. Residential property value is included since 
median housing value would follow the trend of residential property value. Dummy variables 
are included to capture the county-specific characteristics of the trend of the median housing 
value. Since these variables are assumed exogenous, they will be uncorrected with the error 
term of expenditure equation. Hence the estimate of median housing value will be 
uncorrected with that error term as well. 
The regression result is reported in Table 5-2. The land value and residential property 
value have positive coefficients and are significant at the 1% level. All county dummy 
variables except CO13 (Howard), CO15 (Montgomery) and COie (Prince George's) also show 
significant t-statistics. Then, the estimates from this regression are used to project each 
county's predicted median housing values for the years 1929-1955. Those predicted values 
are utilized for further empirical study. 
Including the above estimates, the sample statistics for all variables used in this study 
are presented in Table 5-3. In Table 5-4, the trends of major variables over the years are listed 
as averages across the counties for each year. 
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Table 5-2. Regression result for median housing value, 
Variable Estimate t-statistics 
L(land value) 29.9027* (14.56) 
Vr/10® (residential property) 46.4075' ( 4.02) 
(V/10®)^ (square of residential property) -0.061107** ( -2.22) 
COi -3604.1100* (-4.70) 
CO2 -1930.4959* (-2.89) 
CO3 -5010.4241* (-4.53) 
CO4 -1881.9300* (-4.24) 
CO5 -1922.9616* (-4.34) 
COe -1682.8243* (-3.25) 
CO7 -2037,7551* (-3.96) 
COg -1834.2263* (-4.16) 
CO9 -3151.1873* (-6.90) 
COio -2901.1914* (-4.58) 
co„ -2718.6557* (-6.06) 
CO,2 -1680.8096* (-2.90) 
CO,3 -663.0505 (-1.48) 
C0,4 -2604.4005* (-5.86) 
C0,5 1532.4563 ( 1-65) 
C0,6 -1316.2307 (-1.55) 
C0,7 -2585.0537* (-5.79) 
CO,8 -2135.9156* (-4.84) 
C0,9 -3202.4408* (-7.26) 
CO20 -2500.0633* (-5.47) 
C02, -3103.7668* (-4.17) 
C022 -2260,3167* (-4.63) 
C023 -2449.2320* (-5.34) 
0.9672 
F(26,69) 154.71 
* significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5-3. Sample statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Ew 524713 669109 
Eb 82568 86789 
e„ 108.17 30.99 
eb 80.55 40.24 
Nw 4911 5131 
Nb 1055 752 
Y 1172 423.83 
w„ 2354 573.50 
Wb 1884 867.33 
5 0.6646 0.0281 
P 0.7050 0.0376 
TS 0.000118 0.000092 
V 78550919 97096484 
5168.51 3053.83 
v„ 11160084 21165667 
Vr 67390835 80676890 
L 154.22 65.20 
G 536027 637890 
(Y+TS G) 1241.91 454.13 
g 103.71 71.82 
gf 9.63 23.95 
gs 94.08 61,92 
gc 50.81 21.42 
ge 43.29 44.61 
Table 5-4. Trends of the statistics^ 1929-1955 
Year Nw Nt £« Eb Y+TS -G Y 
1929 4427 1111 68.16 35.03 844.05 829.92 
1930 4481 1101 70.90 36.84 766.38 753.98 
1931 4539 1118 78.66 40.74 814.79 799.91 
1932 4619 1123 86.88 44.85 699.97 683.58 
1933 1683 1138 87.84 46.28 688.50 676.73 
1934 4658 1127 99.83 52.35 929.71 911.73 
1935 4652 1105 79.74 43.54 781.23 763.97 
1936 4618 1081 84.38 47.59 875.45 855.92 
1937 4603 1055 85.87 49.14 907.02 885.37 
1938 4573 1037 94.72 54.84 866.09 843.13 
1939 4603 1044 96.48 62.39 916.10 889.91 
1940 4574 1033 101.74 65.98 975.07 948.29 
1941 4584 1018 98.19 65.25 1181.98 1159.82 
1942 4652 1009 94.96 69.63 1409.41 1386.07 
1943 4750 992 89.29 71.09 1562.99 1538.60 
1944 4797 987 102.06 82.23 1637.33 1604.95 
1945 4866 1014 10443 82.70 1568.28 1531.54 
1946 4208 968 108.36 84.24 1532.18 1487.9! 
1947 4262 979 106.89 86.27 1365.57 1312.59 
1948 4436 991 130.18 104.38 1425.17 1338.66 
1949 4746 1023 140.78 115.98 1445.98 1357.14 
1950 5151 1045 140.88 120.85 1544.12 1458.43 
1951 5518 1044 135.03 121.42 1637.47 1531.85 
1952 5936 1051 145.89 130.11 1740.29 1614.72 
1593 6542 1063 152.58 141.07 1820.80 1672.21 
1954 7224 1091 158.60 152.34 1788.34 1644.23 
1955 7670 1131 173.12 167.73 1807.18 1653.75 
a Figures are averages of county data for each year. 
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Table 5-4. (continued) 
Year g gf & gc Sc 
1929 30.16 0.44 29.72 23.68 6.09 
1930 27.10 0.44 26.67 19.36 7.34 
1931 32.92 0.62 32.30 23.72 8.63 
1932 44.09 0.66 43.43 30.34 13.13 
1933 41.03 0.83 40.20 27.39 12.85 
1934 60.83 0.90 59.93 53.69 6.28 
1935 57.19 0.77 56.42 49.43 7.04 
1936 61.53 8.66 52.87 44.00 8.91 
1937 65.48 13.69 51.79 43.31 8.53 
1938 70.11 6.02 64.10 45.55 18.57 
1939 78.81 12.37 66.44 4S.20 20.26 
1940 83.41 14.90 68.51 46.86 21.67 
1941 70.24 3.95 66.29 45,75 20.56 
1942 69.35 3.53 65.83 42.44 23.40 
1943 66.23 3.37 62.86 41.59 21.29 
1944 81.17 1.88 79.29 4^.99 29.32 
1945 82.33 5.48 76.85 45.15 30.72 
1946 98.06 2.90 95.16 48.04 47.13 
1947 96.51 8.58 87.92 42.37 45.56 
1948 160.00 8.08 151.93 65.93 86.01 
1949 164.56 8.42 156.14 66.02 90.12 
1950 171.10 10.92 160.18 70.35 89.83 
1951 186.30 11.33 174.97 83.58 91.38 
1952 199.24 19.37 179.87 80.04 99.82 
1593 224.05 40.85 183.19 81.84 101.36 
1954 208.10 33.58 174.52 76.56 97.97 
1955 219.83 42.54 177.29 79.12 98.18 
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B. Econometric Results 
1. Linear models (no property tax shifting) 
The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) was employed to estimate the coefficients 
of equations (4.43), (4.47), (4.49) and (4.51) for white schools, and of equations (4.44), 
(4.48), (4.50) and (4.52) for black schools; the dependent variables are the natural log of per 
pupil total current expenditures for white and black, respectively, and no parameter 
identification constraints are imposed. Socioeconomic variables are not added to the equation 
to estimate. Under each hypothesis, the OLS estimates are unbiased and efficient. All of these 
equations are significant, as indicated by the F statistics. The results are presented in Table 5-5 
and 5-6. Coefficient estimates and their standard errors are listed. The asterisk (* or **) next 
to a coefficient value indicates that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero 
at either 1% or 5% significance level according to a two-tailed t test. Also listed are values for 
the coefficient of multiple determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, R^; the sum of 
squared residuals, SSR; the values of testing the overall significance of a set of explanatory 
variables, F( •); and their corresponding degrees of fi-eedom, N-K, where N is the number of 
observation and K is the number of independent variables including the constant term. 
a. Results for white schools 
First, examining the results of theoretically-derived model (4.43) which includes an 
aggregated income term, all coefficients are significantly different from zero. The median 
voter's tax share is related negatively to expenditure for white pupils, as expected, and it is 
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Table 5-5. OLS estimates for white schools' 
Variable (4.43) (4.47) (4.49) (4.51) 
intercept 0.5310" 1.3864* 1.5340* 1.6295* 
(0.2422) (0.1945) (0.1952) (0.1904) 
ln(TS) -0.0389" -0.0166 -0.0194 0.0285 
(0.0182) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0147) 
In Ww® 0.5935* 0.2322* 0.2557* 0.2530* 
(0.0467) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0402) 
Inwb'' -0.2288* 0.0164 0.0044 0.0504 
(0.0435) (0.0368) (0.0365) (0.0360) 
InNw -0.1320* -0.0458* -0.0490* -0.0416* 
(0.0145) (0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0128) 
InNb -0.0394* 0.0114 0.0126 0.0188" 
(0.0091) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0075) 
In (Y+TS G) 0.4571* 
(0.0216) 
hiY 0.1471* 0.1324* 0.1084* 
(0.0227) (0.0230) (0.0228) 
Ing 0.2468* 
(0.0122) 
Ingf 0.0185* 0.0201* 
(0.0032) (0.0031) 
Ings 0.2228* 
(0.0142) 
Inge 0.2927* 
(0.0189) 
Inge 0.0102* 
(0.0027) 
0.6679 0.7916 0.7933 0.8047 
SSR 14.6886 9.2013 9.1127 8.5939 
F ( )  199.759 322.789 285.411 272.471 
d.f. 587 586 585 584 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
Table 5-6. OLS estimates for black schools" 
Variable (4.44) (4.48) (4.50) (4.52) 
intercept -4.4332* -3.1161* -2.9272* -2.8134* 
(0.3612) (0.2918) (0.2953) (0.2912) 
ln(TS) -0.0938* -0.0487** -0.0446** -0.0342 
(0.0271) (0.0212) (0.0218) (0.0225) 
In Ww® 0.5460* 0.0128 0.0354 0.0496 
(0.0697) (0.0626) (0.0631) 0.0615) 
In Wb'' -0.0488 0.3138* 0.2841* 0.3517* 
(0.0649) (0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0551) 
InNw -0.0478** 0.0890* 0.0979* 0.1013* 
(0.0217) (0.0179) (0.0198) (0.0196) 
InNb -0.2153* -0.1378* -0.1363* -0.1271* 
(0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
In (Y+TS G) 1.0067* 
(0.0323) 
InY 0.5370* 0.5222* 0.4917* 
(0.0341) (0.0348) (0.0348) 
Ing 0.3777* 
(0.0183) 
Ingf 0.0194* 0.0235* 
(0.0048) (0.0047) 
Ings 0.3607* 
(0.0214) 
Inge 0.4805* 
(0.0290) 
Inge 0.0092** 
(0.0041) 
0.7797 0.8602 0.8590 0.8638 
SSR 32.6702 20.7035 20.8486 20.1056 
F( •) 350.894 522.189 452.453 418.729 
d.f. 587 586 585 584 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
quite low. The -0.0389 value indicates that demand for education is price inelastic. Most other 
studies, except Feldstein's, concluded that demand for education is price inelastic, although 
this estimate is lower than most. The coefficient of the wage rate of white teachers shows 
positive elasticity, while that of black teachers shows a negative sign, but both are inelastic. 
This implies that the 1% increase in white teacher's wage rate results in the 0.5935% increase 
in expenditure for white pupils, and the 1% increase in black teacher's wage rate decreases 
expenditure for white pupils by 0.2288%. The coefficients of the number of black and white 
pupils show negative sign, which means that as more pupils are attending the school, the 
expenditure share per pupil would decrease. The coefficient of the aggregated income variable 
is positive, as expected, and significantly different from zero. Using the mean values for per 
pupil expenditure for white schools and aggregated income, the 0.4571 elasticity implies that 
an additional dollar of aggregated income leads to an increase in spending of 4 cents. 
For equation (4.47), which separates median income and per pupil grant terms, the tax 
share shows a negative elasticity, but it is not significantly different fi^om zero. The coefficients 
of the black teacher's wage rate and the number of black pupils also are not significantly 
different fi"om zero to explain per pupil expenditure for whites. White teachers' wage rate and 
the number of white pupils estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero, but they 
exhibit much smaller elasticity than equation (4.43). The income elasticity of expenditure is 
0.1471, which is very inelastic but significantly different from zero. An additional dollar of 
income leads to an increase in spending of 1.36 cents. It is interesting to note that income 
elasticity here is much smaller than for most studies that dealt with more recent data sets. The 
coefficient of the total state and federal grant variable, g, is positive and significantly different 
from zero. The expenditure would be increased by $0.26 with an additional dollar of any kind 
of grants. This suggests that districts might use any additional fund to relieve the property tax 
burden. However, this elasticity, 0.2468, is greater than Ladd's (1975) result. 
The results of equation (4.49), where aggregated grants are separated by federal 
education aid and state education aid, are similar to those of equation (4.47). The income 
elasticity is slightly lower than for equation (4.47). An additional dollar of income results in 
1.22 cents of additional spending. The coefficients of federal education aid and total state 
education aid are positive, as expected, and significantly different fi-om zero. Those 
elasticities, 0.0185 and 0.2228, imply that districts would increase spending by $0.21 and 
$0.26 in response to an additional dollar of federal aid or total state aid, respectively. 
Total state education aid is separated by state categorical aid and equalization fiind in 
equation (4.51) to check whether they have any specific impact on expenditures. The 
coefficients are similar to equation (4.49): the effect of tax share is positive but not 
significantly different from zero; the income elasticity is positive and inelastic. The elasticity of 
federal education aid is higher than for that of equation (4.49), as the marginal propensity of 
federal aid to spend is $0.23. Coefficients of both state categorical aid and state block grants 
(equalization fiind) are positive and significant. The elasticities are 0.2927 and 0.0102, 
respectively. An additional dollar of state categorical aid would result in a $0.62 increase in 
spending in the districts, and an extra dollar of state equalization aid would result in a 2.55 
cent increase in spending. The elasticities of state categorical aid and state equalization aid in 
this study can be compared with findings reported by Adams (1979), who studied unified 
school districts in Maryland for 1972-1976. The former is much higher than Adams' (0.074), 
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but the latter is lower than Adams' (0.157). This implies that the responsiveness of 
educational expenditure to state categorical aid had been bigger under the segregated school 
system than under the 1970s unified school system. 
b. Results for black schools 
The results of the theoretically-derived model for black schools, equation (4.44), are 
listed in Table 5-6. The coefficient of the tax share is negative and inelastic. The wage rate of 
black teachers shows a negative sign, but it is not significantly different fi'om zero. The wage 
rate of white teachers reveals a positive elasticity, and it is significant. This is an unintuitive 
finding. The coefficients of the number of black and white pupils show negative signs, 
respectively, and they are significantly different from zero. The elasticity of the aggregated 
income term is positive and unitary elastic. This implies that when there is a percentage 
increase in aggregated income (whether it comes fi'om increase in income or from a larger 
grant from a higher level of government), per pupil expenditure will increase by the same 
percentage as well. This means that an additional dollar of aggregated income leads to a 6.5 
cent increase in spending. 
When income and per pupil total grant are separated in equation (4.48), all but one 
variable show significant and inelastic estimates. Only the wage rate of white teachers is 
insignificant. The tax share shows a negative sign, as expected, and it is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. The coefficient of the wage rate of black teachers is positive. The 
elasticity of the number of black pupils is negative, as expected, but that of white pupils is 
positive. This unexpected sign of the elasticity of the number of white pupils will be explained 
in the next section. The income elasticity is 0.5370. That is inelastic, but it is higher than the 
estimates ofLadd (1975), Feldstein (1975), and Black et al. (1979). An additional dollar of 
income leads to an increase in spending of 3.7 cents. The coefficient of per pupil total aid is 
0.3777. The expenditure would be increased by $0.29 with an additional dollar of aid. 
The results of equation (4.50) are similar to equation (4.48); the signs and levels of 
significance of the coefficients are the same, and the values of elasticities of the parameters are 
quite close to one another. Here again, the coefficient of the number of white pupils is positive 
and significant. The elasticity of federal aid, 0.0194, implies a $0.16 increase in spending for 
black education in response to a one-dollar increase in federal aid. Total state aid has a 
marginal propensity to spend of 0.31. 
In equation (4.52), the tax share coefficient is negative, but not significantly different 
from zero. Other than that, the results again are similar to either equation (4.48) or (4.50). 
The implied marginal propensity to spend of federal aid is 0.20. State categorical aid shows an 
elasticity of 0.4805, which is interpreted as $0.76 increase in spending for an additional dollar 
of state categorical aid. For the state equalization fiind, it is 1.71 cents. 
c. Comparison 
When the results of black and white school districts are compared, there seem to be 
some similarities as well as some differences. Most coefficients are inelastic and significant. 
The responsiveness of expenditures to the tax share, income, and grants between the two 
districts are, however, somewhat different. In general, the estimates of those variables for 
black schools reveal higher responsiveness than for white schools. When there is an additional 
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dollar of either income or any type of block aid, almost all of coefficients for black schools are 
more responsive (elastic) than for white schools, excepting the state equalization fund. Such a 
high responsiveness in black schools might be due, at least partly, to the lack of funds at the 
beginning compared to white schools. 
When the trends of the sample statistics are considered, as in Table 5-4, there are some 
interesting patterns for black and white schools between number of pupils and per pupil 
expenditure. While the average number of white pupils increased somewhat steadily over the 
years, the number of black pupils decreased slowly until 1946, before trending upward. Other 
variables, such as median income and grants (as a total, or for state and federal separately), 
which were great sources of public school financing, show a steady increase over the years as 
the size of the state's or the nation's economy grew. Thus, when the number of white pupils 
increased, it is expected that the voter, local educational agency, or higher levels of 
government would try to increase fijnding to facilitate the necessary expenses through 
property tax collection or grants. This coincided with a greater increase in per pupil 
expenditures for black schools than for white schools, shown in the trend of per pupil 
expenditure. In the early years, the ratio of black and white per pupil expenditure was about 
one-half This gap had been narrowed steadily over the years. At the end of the period 
covered here, the gap had almost disappeared. Therefore, it can be concluded that when the 
number of white pupils increased, it affected positively per pupil expenditure for black 
schools. This might also explain the positive elasticity of the number of white pupils to 
expenditures for black pupils, as in equations (4.48), (4.50), and (4.52). 
The higher responsiveness of expenditure to aid in black schools than in white schools 
can be seen in another way. The effects of aid are simulated such that, after estimating the 
reduced form expenditure equation, the coefficient estimates are substituted into the reduced 
form equation given aid being equal to zero. Then, the estimated (simulated) expenditure level 
is derived as if there is no federal and/or state aid to the districts. This simulated expenditure 
level is, of course, lower than the actual level. Now, the ratio of the difference between the 
actual and simulated expenditure level to the actual expenditure level is derived. This ratio 
implies what percentage of expenditure is accounted for by aid, that is, the degree of a 
district's reliance on aid to finance education expenditure. This is done separately for black 
and white school equations to investigate which schools showed the greater impact of aid on 
expenditure. This procedure is repeated for pairwise equations between (4.43) and (4.44), 
(4.47) and (4.48), (4.49) and (4.50), and (4.51) and (4.52). For pairwise equations (4.43) and 
(4.44), and (4.47) and (4.48), it is set that G = 0, and g = 0, respectively. For equations (4.49) 
and (4.50), it is set that either gf = 0 or g, = 0, separately. It is set that either gc = 0 or ge = 0 
separately for equations (4.51) and (4.52). 
The results'* strongly support the implication of the regression results analyzed above. 
The black schools more heavily depended on the aid for financing expenditure than the white 
schools, since in every district of any year for any type of aid, black schools show a bigger 
ratio than white schools. Even in the case of the state equalization fund, which showed lower 
elasticity in black schools than in white schools, the simulation reveals that black schools 
relied more on state equalization aid than white schools. Thus, it is concluded that, not only is 
the responsiveness of expenditure to aid in black schools higher than in white schools, but the 
degree of reliance on aid for financing expenditure also is higher in black schools than in white 
schools. Therefore, the government education policy, which was revealed through the 
provision of education aid to both black and white schools, could affect black schools more 
than white schools. 
Aid effectiveness appears to depend on whether the aid enters the expenditure function 
via an aggregated income term or not. The income is more elastic to the inclusion of such aid, 
as in equations (4.43) and (4.44). If the aid is not included in the income term, hence 
separated, then income elasticity becomes smaller, as in equations (4.47), (4.49), and (4.51) 
for white schools, and (4.48), (4.50), and (4.52) for black schools. The aid elasticity also 
becomes smaller when it is separated from the income term. 
The federal government's role had been minimal as mentioned earlier. In 1929-1930, 
only 0.4% of all public school revenue receipts for 48 states came from the federal 
government.^ Although the federal share had increased over the years to 1.7% in 1939-1940, 
and 1.9% in 1949-1950, federal financing of education is comparatively inconsequential in 
nature. Maryland was typical. The state contribution to public schools had increased a lot. The 
state aid for all public schools in Maryland had been 19.9%, 27.8%, and 38.1% of total 
current expenses in 1928-1929, 1939-1940, and 1949-1950, respectively. This parallels the 
nation-wide trend, but remains slightly below the national average.® When the total grant term 
is separated between federal and state levels, per pupil expenditure is remarkably less 
responsive to federal aid than to state aid. The elasticities of federal aid are 0.0185 and 0.0201 
for white schools, and 0.0194 and 0.0235 for black schools. The elasticities of state aid are 
0.2228 for white schools, and 0.3607 for black schools. State aid has a greater impact than 
federal aid. Low elasticity and low absolute value of federal aid could affect expenditure small. 
When state aid is divided further by state categorical aid and state block grant 
(equalization fund), the responsiveness is different between the two types of aid, as analyzed 
earlier. The expenditure is much more responsive to state categorical aid than to state 
equalization grants. The equalization fund provided only the additional money needed by each 
county to maintain the state-defined minimum standards for its schools. Hence, it had been 
nonexistent or quite small in a number of counties (school districts) over the early years of the 
period covered here. It is interesting that, although the equalization fund was intended only to 
bring the poorest counties to the basic minimum, every county in Maryland had received this 
aid in later years. In 1950s, the fund supplied around one-half of all the state aid given in 
Maryland. 
In the previous discussion, when the aid responsiveness was interpreted as an increase 
in expenditure with an increment in aid, one should note that both levels of per pupil 
expenditure for black and white schools would be determined simultaneously through the 
decision-making process. Thus, whenever there is additional funding available to the school 
districts, it would affect both black and white schools at the same time. This implies that an 
additional dollar of federal aid leads to an increase in spending of $0.37 as a whole in the 
county ($0.21 for white schools, plus $0.16 for black schools) with equations (4.49) and 
(4.50), and of $0.43 as a whole in the county ($0.23 for white schools, plus $0.20 for black 
schools) with equations (4.51) and (4.52). For total state aid to the districts, this marginal 
propensity to spend becomes 0.57 (= 0.26 + 0.31) with equations (4.49) and (4.50). If the 
state categorical aid to a district is increased by one dollar, it would result in a $1.38 (= $0.62 
+ $0.76) increase in expenditure as a whole in the county. Thus, state categorical aid appears 
to stimulate expenditure by more than the increase in the amount of aid in the county. The 
state equalization flind shows 4.26 cents (= 2.55 + 1.71) of marginal propensity to spend. 
Overall, only state categorical aid stimulates the expenditure level by more than the increase in 
the amount of aid. This implies that there exists a flypaper effect. When other types of aid are 
considered, a part of the additional funds is used to relieve the local property tax burden. 
2. Nonlinear models (partial property tax shifting) 
The specifications (4.53)-(4.60) are the partial shifting models with the parameter 
identification constraints imposed. The dependent variables are the same as in the no-
property-tax-shifting models. The method of nonlinear least squares is required, and the 
equations are estimated using Gauss-Newton method. The results of parameter estimates are 
presented in Table 5-7 and 5-8. Parameter estimates and their asymptotic standard errors are 
listed in parentheses. The asterisk (*) next to a coefficient value indicates that it is 
asymptotically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The sum of squared residuals, 
SSR, the value of the log-likelihood function, L(y), and the log-likelihood ratio, -2^(y ), are 
also listed. 
a. Results for white schools 
Table 5-7 shows the parameter estimates for white schools. The own-price elasticities, 
tti, are all negative, and income and grant elasticities are all positive; all of them are significant 
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Table 5-7. Nonlinear least squares estimates of elasticities, congestion and shifting parameters 
for white schools* 
Parameter (4.53) (4.55) (4.57) (4.59) 
«! -0.2905* -0.2553* -0.2489* -0.2432* 
(0.0488) (0.0430) (0.0417) (0.0420) 
a.2 -0.0115 0.0018 0.0025 0.0244 
(0.0467) (0.0435) (0.0423) (0.0433) 
as 0.6879* 0.4802* 0.4376* 0.4180* 
(0.0243) (0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0303) 
04 0.2294* 0.0297* 0.0326* 
(0.0143) (0.0036) (0.0035) 
OLs 0.1780* 0.1841* 
(0.0158) (0.0212) 
<*6 0.0134* 
(0.0033) 
ITw 1.0170* 1.0788* 1.0578* 1.0463* 
(0.0661) (0.0627) (0.0591) (0.0584) 
tb 7.5735 -35.5939 -23.3276 -2.0796 
(30.4356) (882.8263) (400.9638) (3.8402) 
e 38.4548* 29.2289* 26.5926* 28.3665* 
(4.5900) (5.7392) (5.2378) (6.3930) 
SSR 14.1320 12.6575 12.0853 12.2451 
L(Y) 267.517 300.247 313.998 310.083 
(Log-likelihood) 
-2e{y )  238.994 227.312 194.912 175.266 
(Log-likelihood 
ratio) 
a Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
* asymptotically significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5-8. Nonlinear least squares estimates of elasticities, congestion and shifting parameters 
for black schools" 
Parameter (4.54) (4.56) (4.58) (4.60) 
P. 
h 
h 
P4 
Ps 
P6 
Jtw 
Kb 
e 
0.0521 
(0.0713) 
-0.8142* 
(0.0699) 
1.1419* 
(0.0365) 
-0.3045 
(0.0557) 
4.0816* 
(1.5199) 
22.6400* 
(3.4872) 
0.4498 
(0.0605) 
-0.7125* 
(0.0608) 
0.7687* 
(0.0404) 
0.3533* 
(0.0200) 
-0.1254 
(0.0381) 
2.8422* 
(0.5893) 
7.8797* 
(2.1178) 
0.4702 
(0.0599) 
-0.7263* 
(0.0604) 
0.7325* 
(0.0419) 
0.0329* 
(0.0051) 
0.3004* 
(0.0227) 
-0.1308 
(0.0381) 
2.9987* 
(0.6491) 
7.2321* 
(2.0639) 
0.4747 
(0.0599) 
-0.6708* 
(0.0614) 
0.6712* 
(0.0432) 
0.0382* 
(0.0050) 
0.3737* 
(0.0304) 
0.0085* 
(0.0047) 
-0.1442* 
(0.0390) 
2.5446* 
(0.4633) 
6.7234* 
(2.5389) 
SSR 
L(y) 
(Log-likelihood) 
-2£(Y) 
(Log-likelihood 
ratio) 
31.0961 
33.262 
82.052 
24.9082 
99.154 
58.116 
24.7720 
100.784 
47.188 
24.7263 
101.316 
31.830 
a Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
* asymptotically significant at the 5% level 
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asymptotically at the 5% level. The income elasticities, as, are uniformly much higher than no-
property-tax-shifting estimates, but the grant elasticities show mixed results. Total aid 
elasticity in equation (4.55) is not much different, but a little lower than that of equation 
(4.47). The federal aid elasticities, 0.0297 of equation (4.57) and 0.0326 of equation (4.59), 
are a little higher than the values of 0.0185 of equation (4.49) and 0.0201 of equation 
(4.51),but still are very inelastic. 
The elasticity of total state aid in equation (4.57) is 0.1780, which is lower than that of 
equation (4.49), 0.2228. Also, the state categorical aid shows a lower elasticity in equation 
(4.59) than in equation (4.51), but for the state block aid (equalization fund), they are quite 
close to each other and very inelastic. 
The own-price elasticity of demand is very inelastic for all models in Table 5-7. These 
values indicate that a large local share distortion is needed to induce an appreciable 
expenditure response from the districts. 
The shifting parameter estimates are all significant. The theory indicates that the larger 
the value of 0, the greater the degree of perceived shifting. These large values, therefore, 
indicate that residents perceive substantial shifting of nonresidential property tax onto 
themselves. The asymptotic t statistics provide support for the perceived shifting. 
It is interesting to note that the congestion parameter estimates for white education are 
all close to one, as Borcherding and Deacon (1972) found. These estimates indicate that 
education for white pupils resembles a private good. However, the congestion parameters for 
black education are not asymptotically significant at the 5% level, and neither are the cross-
price elasticities between black and white education. 
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On the bottom row of the table, there are statistics showing -2 times the log-likelihood 
ratio, -2£(y). This statistic is used to test the significance of the function, much like the F 
statistic for linear functions. It is an asymptotically distributed with K-1 degrees of 
freedom, where K is the number of parameters in the tested equation. Thus, the calculated 
values indicate that each specification is significant under the respective hypothesis. 
b. Results for black schools 
All parameter estimates for black schools in Table 5-8 are asymptotically significant. 
The own-price elasticities are all negative, ranging between -0.6708 and -0.8142. Income and 
grant elasticities are all positive. Likewise, in white schools, the income elasticities are 
uniformly higher than the no-property-tax-shifting estimates. The estimate of the aggregated 
income indicates an elastic response of expenditure to a change in aggregated income. Except 
federal aid, all other aid elasticities are lower than in the no-property-tax-shifling models, 
although the differences do not become large. 
The shifting parameters are positive, which indicates that nonresidential property taxes 
are shifted onto the residents. The congestion parameters for black education show that black 
education is regarded as a congested good. For white education, the congestion parameters 
are negative, which is contrary to the theory and unintuitive. 
All positive cross-price elasticities indicate that white education is regarded as a 
substitute for black education. Thus, if the price of white education service is increased, then 
the districts would increase the provision of black education. 
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Again, the values of the log-likelihood ratio tests imply that each specification is 
significant under the respective hypothesis. 
c. Comparison 
As in the linear models, where there occurs no property tax shifting, the estimates of 
black schools show higher responsiveness of expenditure to income and most grant variables, 
except the state equalization fund, than white schools. Thus, it can be concluded that the same 
reasons might be applied here as the linear models. 
The shifting parameters are, however, more responsive in demand for white schools 
than for black schools. But the large value of the parameter estimates indicates that residents 
perceive substantial shifting of nonresidential property tax. 
When cross-price elasticity and congestion parameters for white education are 
considered, the inter-racial factors do not have important roles at all, since the two estimates 
are not significantly different from zero. However, white education and black education 
become a substitute for each other in the provision of black education. 
C. The Specification Tests 
When there are two competing hypotheses. Hi and H2, which are nonnested, the F or 
likelihood ratio tests are not appropriate to determine which of the hypotheses best capture 
the data-generating phenomenon. The goodness-of-fit criteria to test models will lead to the 
selection of the correct model on average if the hypotheses are nonnested and one is true a 
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priori. However, there is no unique goodness-of-fit statistic. Thus, this study relies on the Cox 
specification test to evaluate competing nonnested models.^ 
The Cox test statistic is based on the Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio. To test the 
maintdned hypothesis Hi against the alternative H2, the appropriate statistic is the difference 
between the estimated log-likelihood ratio and its asymptotic expectation under the 
maintained hypothesis. Cox shows that this statistic divided by its standard error is an 
asymptotically standard normal variate. This normalized statistic can be calculated following 
the procedure developed by Pesaran and Deaton (1978). This test statistic is used in a one-
tailed test of the maintained Hi against the alternative H2. If this value is significantly negative, 
then Hi is rejected in favor of H2. If it lies within the designated critical region, Hi cannot be 
rejected and the data supports the maintained hypothesis. Similarly, H2 can be the maintained 
hypothesis against the alternative Hi, repeating the same procedure as above. Such a two-way 
testing allows for bilateral rejection. 
Since the OLS estimates are maximum likelihood estimates under the assumptions of 
the models, the OLS results are used to calculate the test statistic. All the specifications 
(4.43), (4.47), (4.49), and (4.51) for white schools, and (4.44), (4.48), (4.50), and (4.52) for 
black schools are tested pairwise. The statistic values using the Cox procedure is presented in 
Table 5.9, and the test results are summarized in Table 5.10. 
The results in Table 5.10 reveal little support for the aggregated income models.* The 
aggregated income model for white schools, (4.43), is rejected in favor of the disaggregated 
income and per capita total grants formulation, (4.47). That is, using the separate income and 
total grants terms in the model appear to capture the data-generating phenomenon better than 
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Table 5-9. Normalized Cox statistic values 
Maintained 
hypothesis 
Alternative hypothesis 
For white schools 
H(4.43)2 H(4.47)2 H(4.49)2 H(4.51)2 
H(4.43)i -128.5839* -130.6921* -146.4595* 
H(4.47), -1.4070 -3.2385* -7.1605* 
H(4.49), -2.6786* -2.8052* -6.4081* 
H(4.51), -2.7379* -3.6062* -2.3907* 
For black schools 
H(4.44)2 H(4.48)2 H(4.50)2 H(4.52)2 
H(4.44), -89.7349* -82.7161* -87.4267* 
H(4.48)i -2.0158 -2.2803 -5.3826* 
H{4.50)i -3.2720* -3.3195* -5.0890* 
H(4.52)i -3.9362* -6.8442* -6.0618* 
* significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5-10. Cox specification test results 
Models tested Conclusions 
For white schools 
H(4.43), H(4.47) 
H(4.43), H(4.49) 
H(4.43),H(4.51) 
H(4.47), H(4.49) 
H(4.47),H(4.51) 
H(4.49),H(4.51) 
Reject H(4.43) only 
Reject both 
Reject both 
Reject both 
Reject both 
Reject both 
For black schools 
H(4.44), H(4.48) 
H(4.44), H(4.50) 
H(4.44), H(4.52) 
H(4.48), H(4.50) 
H(4.48), H(4.52) 
H(4.50), H(4.52) 
Reject H(4.44) only 
Reject both 
Reject both 
Reject H(4.50) only 
Reject both 
Reject both 
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the aggregated income model. However, bilateral rejections for the remaining pairwise tests 
mean that there is no strong evidence supporting one model over another. For the black 
schools, the aggregated income model, (4.44), is again rejected in favor of the disaggregated 
income and grant model, (4.48). Model (4.48) is also favored against model (4.50), which 
contained the separate federal and state grants terms. The other pairwise tests again show the 
bilateral rejections. 
Overall, the results reveal that the disaggregated income and per pupil total grants 
specification is favored against the aggregated income specification. However, there is no 
dominant model specification for both black and white schools. 
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Notes 
1. Many education expenditure studies use average daily attendance instead of average daily belonging. 
However, when state aid or other funds are calculated and provided in Marj'land, enrollment figure 
had been used according to Maryland General Code. (See Report of Maryland Commission to 
Study Public Education and Finances, 1952, p.45) Note that since attendance and enrollment 
are highly correlated, a correlation of 0.99977 for white pupils and of 0.99735 for black pupils, the 
result of using either one may not be significantly different fi^om using the other. 
2. These data sets are drawn fi-om Dr. TenHoeve's (1992) dissertation. 
3. Borcherding and Deacon (1972) used average (mean) income for their analysis for the same reason 
as here. However, if the median income data were available, it would give better results, as 
Pommerehne and Frey (1976), Pommerehne (1978), and Mathis and Zech (1986) showed. 
4. The simulation results are presented here descriptively only, but not shown, since the volume of 
output is too much to fit in. 
5. See Report of Maryland Commission to Study Public Education and Finances, 1952, p.28. 
6. op. cit. p.37. 
7. The use of the Cox specification test is shown in Tumbull (1987), and this study quotes and follows 
what he suggested. 
8. This result is similar to Tumbull's (1987). 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters have compared the expenditure behavior between black and 
white school districts in Maryland for the years 1929 through 1955, where a segregated 
school system existed. Chapter II provided the necessary background information on 
intergovernmental grants-in-aid and a literature review, and Chapter III provided the premises 
of the median voter model of local expenditure determinants together with some empirical 
specification problems involved with education. It was assumed that voters of a school district 
vote in accordance with their single-peaked preferences for education, and that the majority-
rule decision would decide levels of public service within the governmental budgetary 
constraint. Under these assumptions, a plausible case was made for a median outcome. That 
is, it was postulated that the observed spending level equals the median voter's preferred one. 
On this basis, in Chapter IV, the theoretical model and the specific estimating 
equations were derived under the segregated school system, where a median voter chooses 
both black and white schoolings. The no-property-tax-shifting models and partial-property-
tax-shifting models were specified separately. Note that the theoretically-derived model is 
unique in the sense that inter-racial factors were considered to determine the expenditure level 
for both black and white schools simultaneously. This implies that the demand for education 
for whites, for example, is not only a fijnction of white teachers' wage rate and the number of 
white pupils, but also a fiinction of black teachers' wage rate and the number of black pupils, 
and similarly for education for blacks. 
I l l  
Data were collected for the 23 white school districts and the 22 black school districts 
in Maryland. In Chapter V, the methods of ordinary least squares and nonlinear least squares 
were employed to obtain parameter estimates for no-nonresidential-property-tax-shifting 
models and partial-nonresidential-property-tax-shifting models, respectively. Then, the 
empirical estimates were evaluated. 
Generally, the price elasticity of demand was low. That is, the tax share coefficients 
were negative, as expected, but expenditure was not very responsive to tax share. When 
income and aid variables were treated separately, the effect on expenditure was small except 
for state categorical aid, which stimulates expenditure by more than the incremental amount of 
aid. Other grants served primarily to relieve the property tax burden in the district. 
Estimates of shifting parameters were high and significant, indicating that voters 
perceived that a relatively high share of the nonresidential property tax was shifted to them, 
rather than exported. 
The estimates of a congestion parameter suggested that education for whites was 
regarded as a private good and education for black is regarded as a public good in determining 
the expenditure level of white education. However, education for blacks was revealed as a 
congested good in determining the expenditure level of black education. 
When black and white schools were compared, the expenditure or the demand for 
education in black schools was much more responsive to income and to most types of aid than 
in white schools. In addition, it was shown that black schools more heavily depended on aid to 
financing expenditure than white schools by the results of simulation. This could explain why 
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the gap of per pupil expenditure between black and white schools narrowed over the period. 
This may be explained by the following factors. 
With the median voter model and the proportion of the population between black and 
white being considered, the median voters in the districts in Maryland over the period would 
be whites. The more affluent whites evidently were motivated to increase expenditure on 
black schools. Whether they acted for philanthropic or altruistic reasons, or obtained positive 
externalities from the education of blacks, since schooling teaches respect for the customs and 
mores of a society and education transforms blacks to be a better work force for whites, needs 
to be investigated further. 
Margo (1982), Pritchett (1985) and Gerber (1991) studied public school expenditure 
in the southern states at the turn of the century, from the late 1800s to the early 1900s, when 
blacks were disfranchised. They showed that the school board or local agency helped to fund 
white education by appropriating some of the receipts from black property taxes and the black 
share of state funds that were redistributed to counties on the basis of school population. Even 
though there are no specific data on taxes collected from the black population and on how 
state aid was distributed to black schools in Maryland for the period covered in this study, it is 
hard to imagine that such a discriminatory policy had been exercised since there was no 
disfranchisement of blacks. The blacks as a whole might even form as a political pressure 
group to "vote with their feet" in order to improve their economic and social positions. As a 
result, the gap between black and white narrowed, to be almost equal, at least in per pupil 
expenditure, at the end of the segregated school era. However, equality in expenditure level, 
and, hence reduction of the gap in economic and social well-being in the future, between 
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blacks and whites, could have been achieved much faster had there been a way to allocate 
more of available state and federal grants-in-aid to black schools so as to stimulate the median 
voter's spending on black schools, since the responsiveness of expenditure to and the 
dependency on grants in black schools were greater in general than in white schools. 
The Cox specification test results showed that there is no dominant model 
specification among four competing equations for both black and white schools, though the 
disaggregated income and total grants specification is favored against the aggregated income 
specification. Thus, more theoretical development of the voting model might be called for in 
terms of the responsiveness of expenditure to income and grants. It is plausible that a voter's 
perceived share of education grants may not have the same effect on expenditure as income. 
There are some other issues to be considered for further research in extension of this 
study. First, the supply-side of education needs to be considered further. The assumption that 
the production process has constant to returns to scale may be too strong. The average cost 
function could be a well-behaved U-shaped curve in the long run, and school operation could 
also be at increasing or decreasing cost. Hence, the production process in education could 
show decreasing or increasing returns to scale. The user cost of capital, in another aspect, 
could vary across counties and/or over the period. This allowance for variation in capital 
would give better results to explain the effect of aid on expenditure. Also, the shape of 
demand curves for black and white education could be considered; whether or not the lower 
elasticity estimates for white than for black demand are a consequence of the larger output 
produced, Q, for white education; whether or not there was a hidden supply effect (higher 
cost of black education after a 1941 court decision, which required equal salary payment for 
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teachers with the same skill regardless of race) that might complement shifts in demand for 
black education, thereby causing convergence in per pupil expenditure between black and 
white schools. 
With the modeling of the median voter hypothesis, the cyclical voting problem might 
occur. By including both black and white spending as separate issues, this might weaken the 
case for the single-peaked preference assumption, hence the cyclical majority problem. This 
might require a further investigation. Also, with the congestion parameters, it could be 
considered that ti* and Tib are the same for black expenditure and white expenditure estimates, 
but that the behavioral response differs. 
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